The Next Ten Years in E.U. Copyright: Making Markets Work by Liider, Dr. Tilman
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 18 Volume XVIII 
Number 1 Article 7 
2007 
The Next Ten Years in E.U. Copyright: Making Markets Work 
Dr. Tilman Liider 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dr. Tilman Liider, The Next Ten Years in E.U. Copyright: Making Markets Work, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 1 (2007). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Next Ten Years in E.U. Copyright:
Making Markets Work
Dr. Tilman Liider*
I. TRADITIONAL HARMONIZATION POLICY SO FAR .................... 3
A. WHATHASE. U. HARMONIZATIONACHIEVED SO FAR? ............ 7
B. HAS HARMONIZATION BENEFITED E. U. RIGHT-
H OLD ERS? ........................................................................ 10
II. A CHALLENGE REMAINS: TERRITORIALITY AND RIGHTS
C LEARA NCE .......................................................................... 13
A. TERRITORIALITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TITLES ........... 13
B. Is TERRITORIALITY THE PROBLEM? ................................... 14
III. EMERGING ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS ................................. 16
A . D IGITAL SALES ..................................................................... 16
B. DOWNLOAD VERSUS SUBSCRIPTION ...................................... 17
IV. MAKING MARKETS WORK: THE CASE FOR E.U.-WIDE
ONLINE LICENSING ............................................................... 18
A. WHATISATSTAKE? .......................................................... 18
B. Is THERE A NEED FOR NEW POLICY TOOLS? ...................... 19
V. WHAT ARE THE RELEVANT "ONLINE" RIGHTS? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?publD=200&id=2576. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.Head of the Copyright Unit, European Commission, Brussels. My thanks to Julie
Samnadda and David Baervoets for providing many of the ideas that are incorporated in
this article. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of
the European Commission.
FORDHAMINTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COPYRIGHT AND
RELA TED RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT .............. 21
B. WHO OWNS THE RELEVANT "ONLINE " RIGHTS? ............... 23
C. WHO ADMINISTERS THE RELEVANT "ONLINE" RIGHTS? ........ 24
D. ARE Too MANY RIGHTS INVOLVED IN AN ONLINE
TRANSACTION? ................................................................. 25
E. How DOES THE RECOMMENDATION DEAL WITH THE
ONLINE RIGHTS? ............................................................. 28
1. The Exclusive Right of Reproduction ..................... 29
2. The Exclusive Right of Communication to the
Public ..................................................................... ..3 1
3. The Exclusive Right of "Making Available" .......... 33
F. IS A MORE GRANULAR APPROACH NECESSARY IN
DEFINING "ONLINE" RIGHTS? ......................................... 37
G. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROADCASTING AND
"ONLINE" RI GHTS ............................................................ 39
VI. How ARE "ONLINE" RIGHTS LICENSED'? ............................. 41
A. RECIPROCAL REPRESENTATION A GREEMENTS ................... 41
B. TRANSACTION COSTS IN RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENTS .......... 44
C. RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT ................................................................. 46
D. How WOULD THE MARKET HAVE EVOLVED WITHOUT
THE ONLINE RECOMMENDATION? ..................................... 48
VII. THE ONLINE RECOMMENDATION ................................... 51
A. RIGHTHOLDERS' CHOICE ................................................ 52
B. USERS'CHOICE ............................................................... 53
C. TRANSACTION COST IN THE NEW MODEL .............................. 53
VIII. GOVERNANCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION ...................... 54
A . GOVERNANCE ................................................................... 54
B. DISPUTE RESOLUTION ...................................................... 55
IX. FIRST EXPERIENCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION ................ 56
[Vol. 18
THE NEXT TEN YEARS IN E. U. COPYRIGHT
CONCLUSION-THE YEARS AHEAD ............................................ 59
I. TRADITIONAL HARMONIZATION POLICY SO FAR
Policy in the field of copyright and related rights has
traditionally been part of the European Community's (hereinafter
"the Community") "Internal Market" agenda. According to Article
14 of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community
(hereinafter "the EC Treaty") the Internal Market "shall comprise
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty."' Prior to the harmonization of
national laws covering copyright and related rights-so-called
"related" rights refer, e.g., to the rights of phonogram or film
producers-there were major differences among the laws of the
European Member States in the field of copyright and related
rights. Indeed, some Member States did not foresee any protection
for phonogram producers at all.2 Differences concerned, amongst
others, the scope of exclusive rights, the proprietors of the
exclusive rights, the term of protection, and the remedies available
against infringement. 3  Differences in the level and scope of
Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 14, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C
321) 48 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2 See generally Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
Groflmarkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971] ECR 487 (Westlaw) (bringing to
the fore the absence of protection for phonogram producers in France). A right for
phonogram producers was only introduced in the French Intellectual Property Code on
July 3, 1985. Collecting societies administering and enforcing phonogram producers'
rights were only established in the wake of this new right and the first royalty
distributions for phonogram producers took place in 1989. Germany introduced
producers' rights by jurisprudence in 1936, but the precise scope of phonogram
producers' rights was only codified in the Copyright Act of 1965. In contrast, the United
Kingdom copyright in a sound recording was recognised in the 1911 Copyright Act and a
collecting society, Phonographic Performance Ltd. (PPL) has been active in this country
since 1934. See Eric Keyser, Sound Recordings: The European Perspective, in
COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 49, 49-52 (James M. Kendrick ed.,
2002).
3 See generally Commission Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of
Technology-Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM (88) 172 final (June 7,
1998) [hereinafter Green Paper].
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protection, in the entities enjoying protection and in the duration of
copyright terms caused considerable problems with the free
movement of goods, and thus ran counter to the establishment of
the Internal Market as codified in Article 14 of the EC Treaty.4
Several examples illustrate how disparities among national
laws interfered with the free movement of goods in the Internal
Market. In Deutsche Grammophon, a sound recording had been
placed on the market in France. 5 France, at the relevant point in
time, did not protect sound recordings.6 A German wholesaler
tried to acquire the French sound recordings and sell them in
Germany, undercutting the price fixed by the manufacturer,
Deutsche Grammophon, for sales in Germany.7 Although it could
be argued that the value of the phonogram would be undermined in
Germany if goods that the manufacturer had put on the market in
France without the benefit of copyright protection could be resold
in Germany, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter the "ECJ")
gave priority to the free movement of goods. 8 The goods could,
therefore, be legally sold in Germany, undermining Germany's
protection of sound recordings. 9 In that case, the rules on the free
movement of goods were detrimental to the higher level of
protection for sound recordings that prevailed in Germany.
On the other hand, in EMI Electrola v. Particia Im-und Export,
the copyright for a sound recording had expired in Denmark, but
not in Germany.' 0 In this case, the proprietor of the right in the
sound recording could prevent the importation into Germany of the
4 See, e.g., Council Directive 93/98, 2, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC), OJ 1993 L290/9
(Westlaw) (stating that "[w]hereas there are consequently differences between the
national laws governing the terms of protection of copyright and related rights, which are
liable to impede the free movement of goods and freedom to provide services, and to
distort competition in the common market; whereas therefore with a view to the smooth
operation of the internal market, the laws of the Member States should be harmonized so
as to make terms of protection identical throughout the Community").
5 Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487, Grounds 2.
6 See sources cited supra note 2.
7 See Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487, Grounds 14.
8 Seeid. 13.
9 Seeid. 13,19.
10 Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, 1989 E.C.R. 79,
Grounds 3, [1989] ECR 79 (Westlaw).
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goods sold without his authorization in Denmark." In contrast to
Deutsche Grammophon, disparities in the term of protection were
resolved in favor of the higher level of protection that was granted
in Germany. In Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, the owner of a
rental right in a film was able to enforce his right under Danish law
in order to prohibit rentals of a video-cassette in Denmark, even
though the video-cassette had been sold with his authorization in
the United Kingdom-which at the relevant time did not recognise
a right to control rentals of a film. 12 Again, disparities in national
rules were resolved in favor of preserving the higher level of
protection that prevailed in Denmark.
The European harmonization agenda launched in the mid-
1990s introduced the higher level of protection that prevailed in
some Member States across the Community. All Member States
were obliged to introduce a lending right and the term of protection
for authors was harmonized to life of the author plus seventy years,
the standard that prevailed in Germany.1 3 European harmonization
thus brought a high level of protection for a variety of proprietors
of copyright and rights related to copyright.
In this vein, the European Commission proposed-and the
European Council and Parliament adopted-several directives
harmonizing the substantive law governing copyright at the
Community level. At present, copyright is governed by six sector-
specific directives: Directive 91/250, granting protection to
computer programs; 14 Directive 92/100, obliging Member States to
introduce a rental and lending right for authors, performers,
phonogram producers, and film producers and a series of rights
related to copyright for performers, phonogram producers, film
producers, and broadcasting organizations; 15 Directive 93/83,
11 See id. 14 (holding that a copyright holder can enforce rights in one Member State
when the product was imported from a Member State where the holder is not entitled to
those rights).
12 Case 158/86, Warner Bros. Inc. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, Grounds
18,19, [1988] ECR 2605 (Westlaw).
13 Council Directive 93/98, art. 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC), OJ 1993 L290/9
(Westlaw).
14 Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC), OJ 1991 L122/42 (Westlaw).
15 Council Directive 92/100, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC), OJ 1992 L346/61 (Westlaw).
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introducing a broadcasting right for satellite transmissions and a
clearance mechanism for cable retransmissions;' 6 Directive 93/98,
harmonizing the term of protection for authors, performers,
phonogram producers, and broadcasting organizations;' 7 Directive
96/9, on the legal protection of databases;' 8 and Directive 2001/84,
introducing the artist's resale right. 19 Two more recent directives,
the Information Society (2001/29)20 and Enforcement (2004/48)21
directives, are horizontal measures that apply to a variety of
rights-reproduction, communication, "making available," and
distribution rights-and a variety of right-holders-authors,
performers and producers.
As the directives enumerated above show, traditional Internal
Market policy was essentially concerned with substantive aspects
of intellectual property. Such aspects include the beneficiaries of
these rights-such as the introduction of producers' or performers'
rights in Directives 92/100 and 2001/29-and the term of
protection for authors and owners of related rights-e.g.,
performers, record labels and film producers in Directive 93/98.
E.U. directives focused on substantive copyright and related rights
because at the time it was thought that harmonization would
eliminate legal barriers to the free movement of protected goods or
services across the Community.22 The E.U. copyright directives
16 Council Directive 93/83, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15 (EC), OJ 1993 L248/15 (Westlaw).
17 Council Directive 93/98.
18 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EC), OJ 1996 L77/20 (Westlaw).
19 Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC), OJ 2001 L272/32 (Westlaw).
20 Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC), OJ 2001 L167/10 (Westlaw).
21 Council Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45 (EC), OJ 2004 L157/45 (Westlaw).
22 See, e.g., 1 DAVID T. KEELING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN E.U. LAw 45
(2003) (stating that "[tihe problem in Warner Brothers was due essentially to
discrepancies in national laws. In some countries (notably Denmark and France) a
separate right to control the rental of videos existed. In other countries no such right was
recognised. The ideal solution to problems caused by such discrepancies would, of
course, be to harmonise the national laws and ensure either that a rental right exists in all
the Member States or in none of them."). Such a solution was subsequently adopted on
rental right and lending right and on certain intellectual property rights related to
copyright. See Council Directive 92/100, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC), OJ 1992 L346/61
(Westlaw).
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thus intend to end trade barriers that result from disparate national
copyright rules.
23
A. What has E. U. Harmonization Achieved so Far?
While this policy of harmonization has significantly reduced
the discrepancies between European copyright laws, there is still
some doubt as ti whether it has facilitated the free movement of
goods and services across the Community. 24 It is, however, fair to
say that European harmonization has resulted in a significant
increase in the level of protection when compared to the national
situations prior to harmonization. As the directives mentioned
above show, Member States must now grant protection to a variety
of rights-holders, such as authors, performers, audiovisual
producers, record companies, broadcasting organizations, or
database producers. Due to the legislative efforts of the European
institutions, the Community has now, in a global comparison, one
of the most comprehensive and seamless levels of copyright and
related rights protection.
The European body of copyright framework laws-essentially
so-called "Directives"-protects the basic copyright-relevant acts
such as reproductions, communication to the public-e.g., via
radio or TV broadcasting or web casting-and the "making
available" online of literary, artistic or musical works, sound
recordings, or films. In addition, the Community framework
exceeds the international consensus level of the World Intellectual
23 See Green Paper, supra note 3, at 12 (citing the need to "eliminat[e] obstacles and
legal differences that substantially disrupt the functioning of the market by obstructing or
distorting cross-frontier trade in those goods and services as well as distorting
competition"); Council Directive 92/100 1 (stating that the directive is meant to rectify
differences in the copyright laws of Member States which "are sources of barriers to trade
and distortions of competition which impede the achievement and proper functioning of
the internal market").
24 See, e.g., BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., THE RECASTING OF COPYRIGHT & RELATED
RIGHTS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 22 (2006) ("While successfully removing many
of these disparities at the national level, the harmonisation process has left largely intact a
more serious impediment to the creation of an internal market: the territorial nature of
copyrights and related rights. The exclusivity that a copyright or related right confers
upon its owner is strictly limited to the territorial boundaries of the Member State where
the right is granted. This is a core principle of copyright and related rights, which has
been enshrined in the Berne Convention and other treaties.").
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Property Organisation (WIPO) in various respects by granting
exclusive rights for:
1. The rental and lending of literary, musical and
audiovisual works for authors, performers,
phonogram and film producers;
25
2. Non-original databases like telephone
directories and the like-so-called "sui generis"
database protection;
26
3. The resale of works of art;
27
4. The reproduction and the "making available"
online of broadcasts for broadcasting
organizations;
28
5. The reproduction and the "making available"
online of audiovisual works for film
producers; 29 and
6. The reproduction and "making available" of
performances, including audiovisual
performances and performances contained in a
phonogram.
30
Arguably the most significant measure increasing copyright
protection in the E.U. has come with the 1993 Directive
harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related
25 See Council Directive 92/100, art. 1-2.
26 See Council Directive 96/9, art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EC), OJ 1996 L77/20
(Westlaw).
27 See Council Directive 2001/84, art. 1(1), 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 34 (EC), OJ 2001
L272/32 (Westlaw).
28 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 2(e), 3(2)(d), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC), OJ
2001 L167/10 (Westlaw).
29 See id. art. 2(d), 3(2)(c).
30 See id. art. 2(c), 3(2)(b). Protection under WIPO administered Treaties like the
Rome Convention and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) is limited to
performances fixed in phonograms. Audiovisual performances are not protected at the
international level because parties to the Diplomatic Conference on a WIPO Audiovisual
Performances Treaty could not agree on a provision governing the transfer of rights of
performers to film producers. See Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO: Thirty-
Sixth Series of Meetings, Geneva, Sept. 24-Oct. 3, 2001, Diplomatic Conference on the
Protection of Audiovisual Performances: Memorandum of the Director General, 2,
U.N. Doc. A/36/9 Rev. (Sept. 24, 2001).
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rights.3' With this Directive, the Community has harmonized the
duration of authors' rights to the longest possible level that existed
at that stage-the life of the author plus seventy years for authors
and composers of any type of literary or artistic work.32 On the
other hand, performers, record and film producers, and
broadcasters enjoy a term of protection that stretches fifty years
after the phonogram or film has either been published or after the
recording took place.33
Moreover, the Community is a jurisdiction where "equitable
remuneration" is due for broadcasting of commerical phonograms
by wireless means and public communication of commercial
phonograms. 34 Many Member States have also made use of the
possibility granted in the Information Society Directive-Directive
2001/29-to introduce "fair compensation"-mostly administered
in the form of an equipment or blank recording media levy-for
any copy done by consumers in the privacy of their homes.35
Currently, several E.U. Member States are extending analogue
levy schemes to a variety of digital recording devices. 36 But the
precise scope of the equipment that attracts levies often remains
subject to litigation. Court cases involve the application of levies
31 See Council Directive 93/98, 1993 OJ. (L 290) 9 (EC), OJ 1993 L290/9 (Westlaw).
32 Id. art. 1(1).
33 Id. art. 3(1)-(4).
34 It is possible to exceed this level and grant an exclusive right covering all forms of
broadcast performances. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 20
(Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk (search for "Copyright, Designs and Patent
Act 1988"; then follow "Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c. 48)" hyperlink
under "Results").
35 Stefan Bechthold, Directive 2001/29/EC: Information Society Directive, in CONCISE
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 343, 374-75 (Thomas Dreier & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds.
2006). Should a Member State elect to provide for an exception covering private
copying, it is required to provide for "fair compensation" to right-holders affected by this
activity. In many Member States, the fair compensation requirement is implemented by a
levy system. Levy systems may cover reprographic equipment like photocopiers or fax
machines, as well as audio and video recording equipment, and audio and video cassettes.
Id. at 373-74.
36 Id. at 374 (commenting that "[i]ncreasingly, levy systems are extended to digital
recording equipment (scanners, CD and DVD burners, even computers) and media (hard
drives as well as writable CD and DVD formats)").
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on personal computers and printers 37 or computer hard disks. 38 In
certain Member States, e.g., Greece, Portugal, and Spain, computer
hard disks are exempted from levies by law.39  Despite several
attempts, private copying levies and their scope of application have
never been harmonized at Community level.
40
B. Has Harmonization Benefited E. U. Right-holders?
This allows for the following conclusions-E.U. harmonization
of copyright and related rights rules has increased protection for a
variety of right-holders, especially for authors and publishers of
music and audiovisual works. Authors and composers are, in
addition, often represented by powerful collecting societies.41
37 In response to the request by the German Writer's Collecting Society (VG Wort) to
impose a private copying levy of €30 on PCs, the Arbitration Board of the German Patent
and Trademark Office (Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, or DPMA) decided, on
February 4, 2003, to set a levy of€12 on all PC systems sold in Germany. This decision
was accepted by neither VG Wort nor the German IT industry. VG Wort then proceeded
to take court action in April 2003 against the IT industry to seek to recover copyright
levies at its original proposed rate of F30. On December 15, 2005, the district court in
Munich ruled that a £12 levy per PC should be paid. This judgment is currently under
appeal. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. LAW, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 26 (2003).
38 Id. at 25-26. In the GERICOM case, the Austrian Supreme Court decided on July
12, 2005, that no levies are due on PCs since the hard disk of a PC is used in a multi-
functional way. The Court reasoned that a significant proportion of the uses made of a
PC hard disk were unrelated to the copying of protected works or other subject matter. In
these circumstances, it would be difficult to find adequate criteria for applying the levy.
The Court found that this was different for the hard disk of MP3 players, which fall under
the scope of levies in Austria because MP3 players are, at least at present,
overwhelmingly used to copy protected material. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme
Court] July, 12, 2005, 4 Ob 115/05y, 38 Entscheidungen des 6sterreichischen Obersten
Gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [SZ] No. 4 (Austria) at 492.
39 See Ley 23/2006 (B.O.E. 2006, 162), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/
2006/07/08/pdfs/A25561-25572.pdf (amending Spain's Law of Intellectual Property.
"Ley 23/2006, de 7 de julio, por la que se modifica el texto refundido de la Ley de
Propiedad Intelectual, aprobado por el Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de
abril").
40 HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 6-7 ("[B]ut the thorny issue of levies that was
already mentioned in the Green Paper of 1988, has remained on the Commission's
agenda until this day.").
41 Commission Staff Working Document, Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-
border Collective Management of Copyright, at 21 (July 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/management/study-
collectivemgmt en.pdf [hereinafter Community Initiative]. In 2005 the Commission
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The fifty-year term of protection for record companies has also
benefited these industries, as broadcasting and other forms of
communication to the public are subject to "equitable
remuneration" under the 1992 Rental and Lending Directive-
Directive 92/100.42 This contrasts with the United States, where
broadcasters pay no remuneration for the use of commercial
phonograms.43  In addition, with respect to other forms of
communication, wide-ranging exceptions from the obligation to
pay royalties apply in favor of drinking and eating establishments
and shops in the United States. 44 Some estimate that this right to
collect equitable remuneration for television and radio
broadcasting and for other forms of communication ("public
communication") more than makes up for the shorter term that
conducted a survey of European collecting societies active in the field of authors' and
producers' rights in the musical sector. This survey identified 152 collective rights
management societies acting on behalf of approximately 1.6 million right-holders and, in
2003, managing F4.9 billion of royalties per year. Out of this revenue collected, C3.8
billion was distributed. Cross-border distribution of royalties within the E.U. in 2003
amounted to £322 million. Distribution to third countries outside the E.U. amounted to
E184 million. Out of the 152 societies identified, eleven achieve an annual turnover that
exceeds £100 million. The six biggest societies were identified as the German society
GEMA (E813.6 million), the French society SACEM (C708.5 million), the Italian society
SIAE (E475.3 million), the U.K. society PRS (£400.4 million), the French society SDRM
(£349, 8 million), and the U.K. society MCPS (E325.5 million). Eighty-percent of the
revenue generated with collective rights management arises from the exploitation of
musical works and is generated by the top ten societies that are active in this field. The
top four societies in terms of revenue are all authors' rights societies. Two of the top
eleven societies-PPL and GVL-are not classical authors' societies, but represent
record producers. Id. This study was later incorporated into the Commission services
staff working paper of 11 October 2005, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact
Assessment of Reforming Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright and Related
Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, at 11 (Oct. 11, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/management/sec-2005-1254_en.pdf
(last visited Sep. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Impact Assessment], that preceded Commission
Recommendation 2005/737. Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276)
54 (EC), OJ 2005 L276/54 (Westlaw).
42 Council Directive 92/100, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC), OJ 1992 L346/61 (Westlaw).
The main collection societies in this field, the German society GVL and the U.K. society
PPL, in 2003, collected £147 and E 114 million respectively.
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2000).
44 See id. § 1 0(5)(B)(ii).
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performers and phonogram producers enjoy in the E.U. as
compared to the United States.45
Even performers, arguably the least protected category of right-
holders internationally, collect revenue-so-called "equitable
remuneration"-for the broadcasting of their performances 46 and
private copying levies 47 from the information and communication
technology (ICT) industries. One issue remains: has this seamless
web of protection also increased income levels for all right-holders
that are endowed with either exclusive rights or rights to receive
various forms of remuneration? In particular, collecting societies
that represent performers argue that they have not earned any
significant revenue from, the online exploitation of their
performances.48 This raises the issue that it may not appear
sufficient to put in place a comprehensive and seamless web of
45 If the system in the United States was the same as in the E.U., a study cited in the
Gowers Report suggests that European right-holders would receive $25.5 million per year
for the broadcasting of their phonograms in the United States. From this the Gowers
Report appears to conclude that it may be possible that the total revenue received from
the broadcasting and other communication of commercial phonograms received in the
E.U. is no less than, and may be even more than, the revenue received in the United
States. See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 49-50
(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowers-report-
755.pdf.
46 Record producers and performers have a right to equitable remuneration if
commercial phonograms are communicated to the public. See Council Directive 92/100,
art. 8(2).
47 According to a study undertaken by the Association of European Performers'
Organisation (hereinafter "AEPO") collecting societies representing performing artists, in
2005, collected a total of €113.2 million in levies that compensate for private copying.
According to AEPO this constitutes almost 38% of all sums collected by collecting
societies administering performers' rights. The biggest percentage, almost 57%, is
derived from equitable remuneration for broadcasting and other forms of communication
to the public. ELS VANHEUSDEN, PERFORMERS' RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LEGISLATION:
SITUATION AND ELEMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT 74-75 (2007).
48 See, e.g., id. at 6 ("In the field of the Internet and new services, the introduction at
European level in 2001 of a new right [of] making available to the public of services on
demand has so far proved ineffective for performers .... [Olut of the 10 countries
surveyed, only [one] collective [rights] management society succeeded in collecting an
overall amount of £32 for all performers in 2005[.] . . . At a time when more and more
commercial services for downloading are being developed, this sum highlights the
obvious gap between the protection that the acquis [the harmonised body of Community
copyright rules] intended to give to performers and the impossibility of the[m] actually
enjoying it.").
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protection, these rights must also be administered in an effective
manner. Rights that are not effectively administered serve little
purpose to their respective proprietors.49  In other words, the
market for rights management, including rights licensing, must
actually work for all the right-holders concerned. This brings us to
the issue of territorial rights management in Europe.
II. A CHALLENGE REMAINS: TERRITORIALITY AND RIGHTS
CLEARANCE
The ambitious drive toward harmonization of substantial rules
on copyright and related rights has not ended one European
phenomenon-all harmonized titles granted remain national
titles. 50 In other words, there is no single E.U. title for any of the
harmonized forms of protection, not even the Internet-tailored
"making available" right.
A. Territoriality of Intellectual Property Titles
There are many scholars who believe that the territoriality of
national, but substantively harmonized, copyright laws remains a
major obstacle preventing an integrated European digital
marketplace.51 In this context, it is often pointed out that the
Commission's 2005 Recommendation on collective cross-border
management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online
music services-to be discussed below-is merely a first step
49 See, e.g., id. at 36 ("Furthermore, the royalties declaration documents handed over by
producers to the main performers almost never include a line regarding "on demand"
exploitation. Performers therefore have no idea about the way in which the right is
exercised by producers and the revenues it generates.").
50 See, e.g., GOwERS, supra note 45, at 38 (noting the difficulty of protecting patent
rights because "each European patent is a series of separate national patents subject to
national jurisdictions"). See also Council Directive 2001/29, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10,
16 (EC), OJ 2001 L167/10 (Westlaw) (discussing requirements of Member States to
provide authors the exclusive right as to "making available").
51 See, e.g., HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 218 (contending that "[t]he Achilles
heel of the acquis remains the rule of territoriality. The seven directives have smoothed
out some of the main disparities between the laws of the Member States, but largely
ignored the single most important obstacle to the creation of an internal market in
products of creativity: the territorial nature of the economic rights. This allows for the
compartmentalisation of the internal market along geographic boundaries.").
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toward E.U. licensing as it fails to overcome territorial rights
management.52
Others argue that E.U.-wide management is not only necessary
for rights in musical works or sound recordings, but also these
principles should be further extended to audiovisual works as
well.53 They argue that at this stage, due to inefficient licensing
practices, performers in both musical and audiovisual works have
not earned any significant revenue from the online exploitation of
their performances. 54  Better rights management is therefore
indispensable to make the Internet a source of income for these
rights-holders.
B. Is Territoriality the Problem?
Many stakeholders argue that "online" rights--e.g., the
exclusive rights of reproduction, communication to the public and
the right of "making available" online-can no longer be exercised
or enforced on a national basis and that the entire body of E.U.
copyright laws should be reworked to overcome territorial
management or enforcement. 55  The European Parliament has
expressed a keen interest that legislation be proposed in this matter
and believes that licensing principles should now be codified in an
E.U. directive. 56  Hugenholtz et al., in their report, argue that it
52 See, e.g., id. at 218 ("While the Commission's more recent Online Music
Recommendation-[Recommendation 2005/737]-does address some of the problems
caused by territoriality in the field of collective rights management of musical works,
even the Recommendation does not question the territorial nature of copyright and related
rights as such.").
53 See, e.g., VANHEUSDEN, supra note 47, at 36.
" See id.
55 LUCIE GUIBAULT ET AL., STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT IN MEMBER
STATES' LAWS OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29 ON THE HARMONIZATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 173 (2007). On June 9,
2006, Berlecon Research hosted a fact-finding workshop in which participants, in
particular content providers and users, expressed their support for Community-wide
licensing. A Community license for Internet and mobile services was seen to facilitate
the emergence of innovative business models as diverging local laws were found to
hinder effective cross-border licensing. See id. at 171-79.
56 Report on the Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective
Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music
Services, EUR. PARL. DOC. A6/0053 19 (2007), available at
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might be time to consider overcoming territoriality by creating a
European title of copyright. 57  Some arguments in favor of a
Community copyright imply that the main beneficiaries of the
current practice of territory-by-territory licensing are European
collecting societies tasked with administering most of these
"national" rights.58
These are some of the reasons why Internal Market policy
should focus more strongly on facilitating market entry by new
online service providers that disseminate works and sound
recordings on an E.U.-wide scale. While the legal level of
territorial protection in the E.U. is very high, the complexity of
administering the system might prevent rewarding those who enjoy
the protection of the law. When the Commission consulted
stakeholders in July 2005, this exercise revealed that the current
management of copyright in musical works and phonograms-
within defined territories that usually are national borders-was a
source of considerable inefficiency more so than the territorial
59scope of the legal title. It was territorial management that was
deemed to hinder the entry of new Internet-based services that rely
on protected works and phonograms.
60
Before we examine how copyright policy can ensure that the
plethora of rights that exist at E.U. level lead to tangible revenue
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0053+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN (inviting "the
Commission to make it clear that the 2005 Recommendation applies exclusively to online
sales of music recordings, and to present as soon as possible-after consulting closely
with interested parties-a proposal for a flexible framework directive to be adopted by
Parliament and the Council in codecision with a view to regulating the collective
management of copyright and related rights as regards cross-border online music
services...").
" HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 219 ("Long considered taboo in copyright
circles, the idea of a Community copyright modelled after the Community rights that
already exist in the realm of industrial property, is gradually receiving the attention it
deserves, both in political circles and in scholarly debate.").
58 See id. at 220 ("Surely, for collecting societies, the prospect of introducing a
Community copyright and abolishing 'national' rights is unattractive, to say the least.
Territorial rights are the bread and butter of most existing collecting societies.").
59 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54, 54-57 (EC), OJ
2005 L276/54 (Westlaw).
60 See HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 218.
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streams for the proprietors of these rights, we should briefly review
the types of services that have the above-mentioned vocation to be
supplied across the E.U., and thus constitute potential sources of
considerable right-holder income.
III. EMERGING ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS
The Information Society added a variety of innovative services
which are either provided electronically at a distance--e.g.,
webcasting, Internet-based television "IPTV"-or on specific
request from the consumer-e.g., interactive "on-demand" retail
services.
A. Digital Sales
Screen Digest estimates that consumer spending on online
music more than doubled between 2005 and 2008.61 In 2006,
digital retail services created revenue of £281 million, 90% of
which Screen Digest attributes to online retail services. 62
According to IFPI there are currently 320 online music services in
Europe.
63
The online retail market for music downloads in the United
States still by far exceeds the European market -this in spite of
the fact that there are more broadband connections in Europe than
in the United States.65 In the U.S. consumers "downloaded" more
than half a billion single tracks in 2006 while the E.U. figure stood
at roughly one fifth of that amount.66 On the other hand, the E.U.
is ahead of the U.S. with respect to mobile phone subscriptions.67
61 The Rise of the Online Music Market, SCREEN DIGEST, Jan. 2007, at 13, 14.
62 Id. at 13.
63 INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI: 07 DIGITAL MusIc REPORT 5 (2007)
[hereinafter IFPI 2007], available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/digital-music-
report-2007.pdf (last visited September 21, 2007).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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U.S. E.U. 68
Global Digital Music Market(m) 2005 2006 2005 2006
Broadband lines 43 57 68 94
Single tracks downloaded 353 582 62 111
Mobile phone subscriptions 174 194 622 656
3G mobile subscriptions 3 15 6 27
B. Download Versus Subscription
The introduction of new digital transmission platforms, such as
web-based and other online delivery solutions, will lead to more
cross-border provision of online music services. These new
technologies have also led to the emergence of a new generation of
service providers, ranging from "download-to-own" online shops,
subscription services and web casters.
69
"Among the major brand names, two distinct business models
have emerged in digital music: [i] pay-per-download and [ii]
subscription services. Pay-per-download services meet consumer
demand to 'own' music, but with greater flexibility than CDs as
tracks can be selected and downloaded on the spot."'70 According
to Screen Digest, pay-per-download services still dominate the
European digital market and, in 2006, accounted for over 90% of
online music spending. 7'
Subscription services offer a wide choice of music
for a monthly fee, allowing users to access all the
music they want with the option to purchase
selected tracks. [Subscription services] offer
streaming and radio-play access for a monthly
fee .... Downloads and burns are available for an
extra per-track fee .... Some subscription
services ... allow[] 'tethered downloads' which are
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., The Rise of Online Music in Europe, supra note 61, at 14.
70 INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI: 05 DIGITAL Music REPORT 7 (2005)
[hereinafter IFPI 2005], available at http://www.beatsuite.com/pdfs/digital-music-report-
2005.pdf (last visited September 21, 2007).
71 The Rise of the Online Music Market, supra note 61, at 13.
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transferable to portable players for as long as the
consumer remains a subscriber.
72
Another subscription-based service is so-called "podcasting,"
i.e., services that distribute syndicated programmes for
consumption on portable devices, such as iPods-hence the term
"podcasting."
But various other new business models are emerging as well.
In 2006, advertising-supported services became a new revenue
stream for record companies. "Internet advertising is forecast by
Forrester Research to overtake traditional radio advertising in
2010."
73
IV. MAKING MARKETS WORK: THE CASE FOR E.U.-WIDE ONLINE
LICENSING
In the era of online exploitation of works and sound recordings,
commercial Internet shops that engage in retail of protected works
or sound recordings need a licensing policy that is in line with the
ubiquity of their respective on-line services. In 2004 record
companies digitized and made available their repertoire in bulk.
Now, they have started to market, promote and sell music for
online applications such as download and subscription, across
Europe.74 These services can be accessed across Europe and, in
consequence, legal certainty for users requires copyright to be
cleared throughout Europe.
A. What is at Stake?
While the provision of music in the online environment has
become international in scope, the traditional collective rights
management structure in the E.U. has remained national and thus
territorial in scope.75 But online retailers see the requirement of
territory-by-territory management as an impediment to the roll-out
72 IFPI 2005, supra note 70, at 7.
73 IFPI 2007, supra note 63, at 12.
74 See The Rise of the Online Music Market, supra note 6 1, at 14.
75 See GUIBAULT ET AL., supra note 55, at 173 (stating that "[e]xclusive rights are still
drawn along national borders").
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of new cross-border online services. 76  Rights-holders state that
complications inherent in the licensing process deprive them of
online revenue. 77 Online retailers therefore require cross-border or
trans-national copyright clearance in line with their international
reach and clearance services. These services cannot be provided
effectively or efficiently when copyright clearing services remain
78mostly national in scope.
In light of the new online service offerings, Community
copyright policy has now shifted toward streamlining the copyright
licensing process. Simple and efficient rights clearance not only
enables online service providers to achieve economies and
efficiencies of scale, but it also leads to market entry by
innovators, the development of new online services and, most
importantly, has the potential to increase the revenue stream that
flows back to the right-holders.79
B. Is There a Need for New Policy Tools?
In order to achieve these goals, E.U. policy tools as well as the
management of copyright should also become more flexible. In
2005, the Commission decided to test a new instrument-the
Commission recommendation. After conducting a preparatory
study and an impact assessment of various options, 0 the
Commission, on October 18, 2005, adopted a recommendation on
76 See id. at 174 (noting that each E.U. Member State's individual understanding of
copyright limitations has forced content providers to ascertain the exact status of the law
in every Member State, a process that undermines the flexibility that providers need to
pursue online activities).
71 Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 6.
78 See id.
79 As mentioned above, the economic and societal impact of collective rights
management in the musical sector in Europe is considerable. The Commission's most
recent survey identified 152 collective rights management societies, acting on behalf of
approximately 1.6 million right-holders and, in 2003, managing E4.9 billion of royalties
per year. Community Initiative, supra note 4 1, at 21. Copyright, in Europe is to a large
extent characterised by the activities of collecting societies who "turn rights into money."
Walter Dillenz, Functions and Recent Developments of Continental Copyright Societies,
12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 191, 192 (1990).
80 See Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 32; see generally Community Initiative,
supra note 41 (examining problems posed by the traditional collective management
system and predicting the impact and feasibility of various remedial options).
2007]
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J [
collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights
for legitimate online music services (hereinafter "the
Recommendation").81
A recommendation is a non-binding instrument introduced
under Article 211 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (hereinafter "EC Treaty").82 To that extent, it is
introduced as part of the Better Regulation agenda.83  The
Recommendation opted to interpret E.C. Treaty rules that apply to
the cross-border management of certain "online" rights. 84 It also
recommends measures on transparency and governance." For
obvious reasons of inter-institutional balance and its own
participation in the decision-making process, the European
Parliament would have preferred a binding legal instrument. 86 A
recommendation does not exclude recourse to legislation. It is
often seen as a first step in preparing a subsequent legislative
approach.
"As the Recommendation opted for a 'light touch' non-binding
approach to the matter of E.U.-wide online licensing," the
Commission has now published a "call for comments" with the
aim of monitoring commercial developments. 87  The
Recommendation has triggered a consultative process not unlike a
sector enquiry. Such an enquiry should allow all relevant
81 Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54 (EC), OJ 2005
L276/54 (Westlaw).
82 EC Treaty, art. 211.
83 See Better Regulation Conference, September 22-23, 2005, Edinburgh, Scot.,
Competitiveness and Consultation: Business at the Heart of Europe, at 7 (Nov. 2005),
http://www.swyddfa-
cabinet.gov.uk/regulation/documents/europe/pdf/conference-report.pdf.
84 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, passim 81.
85 See id. at 56.
86 See Report on the Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective
Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music
Services, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6/0053 4 (2007), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef =-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0053+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN [hereinafter Report
on the Commission Recommendation].
87 European Commission Call for Comments of 17 January 2007,
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/copyright/docs/management/monitoringen.pdf
[hereinafter Call for Comments].
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policymakers to better understand what is happening in the
marketplace and to better appreciate the technical features of
collective licensing of online rights. If the monitoring reveals the
necessity of adopting binding rules with respect to certain features
of the licensing process, the monitoring would indicate what sort
of rules are most suitable and wished for by the relevant operators
in the different online markets. In order to increase the general
understanding of the online licensing markets, the "call for
comments" touches upon the following issues:
1. What are the tenders that are underway which
envisage E.U.-wide licensing arrangements?
2. What are the E.U.-wide licensing arrangements that
have been set up?
3. Which online service providers benefit from E.U.-
wide licenses for their pan-European retail or other
activities?
4. What types of online services are most interested in
obtaining E.U.-wide licenses?
5. What legislative or other types of obstacles have
been encountered in setting up E.U.-wide licensing
arrangements?
V. WHAT ARE THE RELEVANT "ONLINE" RIGHTS?
A. The Legal Framework for Copyright and Related Rights in the
Digital Environment
The legal framework for copyright in the digital environment is
the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC 88 (hereinafter "the
Directive"). The stated aim of the Directive is to implement the
88 Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC), OJ 2001 L167/10 (Westlaw).
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Community's obligations under the WIPO Copyright Treaty
("WCT") and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
("WPPT"), both adopted in 1996.89 These Treaties update
copyright for the digital environment.9 ° Another aim was to
harmonize certain aspects of copyright and related rights,
91
including the exceptions to those rights.
92
The Community's international obligations in the area of
copyright and related rights flow principally from the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs
Agreement").93 The other relevant conventions are the Berne
Convention, the Rome Convention, the WCT, and the WrpPT.
94
Although the Community is not a party to the Berne Convention-
89 Id. at 11. Recital 15 of the Directive states that the those Treaties update the
international protection for copyright and related rights significantly, not least with regard
to the so called "digital agenda" and improve the means to fight piracy worldwide. Id.
90 See id.
91 See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Sociedad General de Autores y
Editores de Espafia (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA, Case C-306/05, [2006] E.C.R. 43,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005C03
06:EN:HTML. "It is clear that the Copyright Directive is intended to be a harmonising
directive, designed above all to 'help to implement the four freedoms of the internal
market' and 'provid[e] for a high level of protection of intellectual property."' Id. The
Court of Justice meanwhile confirmed this conclusion in Case C-306/05, Sociedad
General de Autores y Editores de Espafia (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-
11519 36.
92 See, e.g., Council Directive 2001/29, recital 31, at 12 (speaking to the balance of
interests between the different categories of right-holders themselves, as well as between
the different categories of right-holders and the users of protected works or sound
recordings). This recital further mentions that existing differences in the exceptions and
limitations to the rights granted by the Member States could have negative effects on the
functioning of the internal market and that these differences could well become more
pronounced with the further development of cross-border exploitation of copyright
protected works. Id. For a critical evaluation of this harmonization approach, see
GUIBAULT ET AL., supra note 55, at 63. ("In view of the optional character of the list of
limitations contained in articles 5(2) to 5(5) of the Directive, [the articles that govern
exceptions and limitations], the harmonising effect is very modest at best .... In view of
this mosaic of limitations in place throughout the European Community, it is safe to say
that the aim of harmonisation has hardly been achieved and legal uncertainty persists.").
93 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1(1), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1197 [hereinafter TRIPs].
94 See id.
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and indeed could not be, since membership of the Berne Union is
confined to the countries of the Union-it is required to comply
with Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention by virtue of Article 9
of the TRIPs agreement.
95
In order to comply with the obligations introduced under the
WCT and the WPPT, the Directive harmonizes:
" the exclusive right of reproduction which fully
applies in the digital environment (Article 2 of the
Directive and Article 1(4) WCT; Article 7, 11 and
16 WPPT and Agreed Statements); 96
" The exclusive right of communication to the public
(Article 3 of the Directive and Article 8 WCT);9 7
and
" the right of making available (Article 3 of the
Directive and Article 8 WCT; Article 10, 14 WPPT
and Agreed Statements).9"
B. Who Owns the Relevant "Online" Rights?
There are many right-holders--e.g., authors, composers,
publishers, record producers and performers-and rights-e.g.,
communication to the public, reproduction and "making
available"-that are involved in a single transaction involving the
electronic provision of music. A separate license has to be sought
from a different collective rights manager, i.e. an authors' society,
record producer's society, and, possibly, a performing rights
society, for every single transaction.99 It should also be noted that
a license granted by a collecting society for one form of
exploitation does not mean that any other form of exploitation is
9' Id. art. 9(1).
96 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 2, at 16.
9' Id. art. 3(1).
98 Id. art. 3(2).
99 See Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 8.
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authorized. A separate license has to be negotiated for each form
of exploitation.'00
In the online environment authors' rights comprise: (1) the
right of reproduction; (2) the right to communicate musical works
to the public including; (3) the "making available" of these works
to the public.' 0' "Rights of performers, and record producers
(record labels) are related rights and remunerate the producers and
the performing artists for use of a sound recording."' 10 2
Performers have the exclusive right to allow: (1) the
reproduction of fixations of their performances; 0 3
(2) the right to receive equitable remuneration if a
commercial phonogram is broadcast by wireless
means or communicated to the public;'0 4 and (3) the
right to make their fixed performance available.' 05
" Record producers have the right to authorize
reproduction and the right to make available sound
recordings. 1
06
C. Who Administers the Relevant "Online" Rights?
"Rights of authors [of musical works] are administered
collectively by authors' societies."' 0 7  Authors, composers and
publishers own the rights in the composition of the lyrics and/or
the music. 10 8 In most Member States, a single society administers
the authors' reproduction, public performance, and "making
100 Id.
101 Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54, 55 (EC), OJ 2005
L276/54 (Westlaw).
102 Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 8.
103 Council Directive 92/100, art. (7)(1), 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC), OJ 1992 L346/61
(Westlaw).
104 Id. art 8(2).
'0s Id. art. 9(1).
106 Id. art. 7(1), 9(1).
107 Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 7.
108 See id. (stating that "[aluthors hold the rights in the composition of the
lyrics/music").
[Vol. 18
THE NEXT TEN YEARS IN E. U. COPYRIGHT
available" rights on a territorial basis.10 9 In some Member States,
the right of reproduction and the rights of communication to the
public are administered by separate societies-again, on a
territorial basis.' 10 In most Member States, the performers' and
record producers' right to receive equitable remuneration is
administered by a collecting society."' "Record producers...
manage their 'making available' right for online on-demand
services on an individual basis."' 12
D. Are Too Many Rights Involved in an Online Transaction?
The multitude of rights and right-holders (and collecting
societies) that are involved in online retail transactions have raised
the issue of whether online retail transactions involve too many
109 See Nanette Rigg, The European Perspective: Collective Management of Rights in
Europe from 1777 to 2002: Why is it Necessary?, in COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 2, at 18, 22 (explaining how societies emerged in a
"patchwork fashion" in Europe). In Germany and Switzerland societies tend to manage
authors' public performance, broadcasting and mechanical reproductions rights in one
society while Britain or France have developed separate societies for authors'
performance rights-e.g., public performance and broadcasting-and mechanical
reproduction rights. Spain and Italy, on the other hand, have each developed one society
that operates on behalf of all right holders and all rights. Id.
110 See, e.g., Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 41. (listing the collecting societies for
each Member State, and the respective categories of rights and right-holders which they
administer).
111 VANHEUSDEN, supra note 47, at 27 (stating that "[i]n all [European] countries the
right to remuneration is exercised through a collecting society").
112 Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 8. Individual management of copyright and
related rights is not covered by the scope of the 2005 Commission Recommendations on
online licensing. "With regard to the making available right necessary to be cleared for
the provision of on demand services by broadcasters of their radio or television
productions incorporating music from commercial phonograms as an integral part
thereof," Recital 26 of the Copyright Directive "states that collective licensing
arrangements are to be encouraged in order to facilitate the clearance of the rights
concerned." Council Directive 2001/29, recital 26, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 12 (EC), OJ
2001 L167/10 (Westlaw). On this basis, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)
advocates mandatory collective management of making available rights of producers and
performers in commercial phonograms, in so far as such commercial phonograms are an
integral part of TV or radio productions. Initial EBU Comments on 'Commission Staff
Working Document: Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective
Management of Copyright,' 19.8.2005/MB/HR 1, 2 (2005), available at
http://www.ebu.ch (follow "Position papers" hyperlink; follow hyperlink dated
19.08.2005).
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different rights and right-holders (and collecting societies). Most
recently, Hugenholt et al. criticized that the Community
legislator's drive for harmonization of copyright and related rights
has introduced too many (overlapping) layers and categories of
different rights." 3  Indeed, a download service would need to
license both the reproduction and the "making available" right
from all right-holders who enjoy these rights separately. 14 In
these circumstances there are calls for streamlining and
consolidating the different rights. 1 5  Two solutions are often
mooted for this scenario: statutory presumptions on transfer of
ownership and joint administration of different categories of rights.
Statutory presumptions of transfer of rights are sometimes
mooted as a tool to enhance efficiency of the clearance process." 16
While transfer-of-ownership rules might facilitate the rights
clearance process by introducing a "one stop shop" principle in
rights management, a debate on the transfer of copyrights would
almost certainly generate fierce political opposition. Many of the
smaller and "weaker" rights holders-categories of authors or
performing artists-are represented by collecting societies which
trace their origins back to the perceived necessity to defend their
interests independently from other right-holders. If rights would
be systematically transferred to corporate entities, such as under
the United States "works for hire" rule, collective representatives
113 See, HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 164. "New categories of rights,
introduced initially at national level and later confirmed in the copyright 'acquis', have
added new layers of protection to existing cultural productions, and have brought new
categories of right-holders into the realm of copyright and related rights .... As a result,
a single object may now be protected by various layers of overlapping rights, each of
which will be held by a different right owner." Id.
114 See, Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 8. "[T]here are many right-holders and
rights that could be involved in a single transaction in the music industry. A licence
granted by a CRM for one form of exploitation does not mean that any other from [sic] of
exploitation is authorised and so a separate licence has to be sought from a different
collective rights manager i.e. an authors' society, record producer's society and
performing rights society for any single transaction. Management of online exploitation
of musical works is complicated by the fact that a multitude of rights (e.g.,
communication to the public, reproduction and making available) belonging to a
multitude of right-holders (e.g., authors, composers, publishers, record producers and
performers) need to be cleared." Id.
115 Some of these initiatives are described in HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 170.
116 See id.
Vol. 18
THE NEXT TEN YEARS IN E. U. COPYRIGHT
of these categories of right-holders would lose their role as an
essential intermediary between individual right-holders and
commercial users of protected material. Collecting societies
therefore often describe their role as the defence of their members'
interests against "powerful corporate players."" 7
Another solution proposed to address the variety of copyrights
that need, e.g., to be cleared for downloading a music track is
contained in the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property.118
According to Gowers, the public performance rights and
mechanical reproduction rights of all rights holders-authors,
performers, and record companies-should be managed by one
entity and the respective rights should be licensed by means of a
single license.' 19 A similar approach already bore some fruit with
respect to the administration of private copying levies, where
central umbrella societies administer private copying levies on
behalf of a variety of beneficiaries and their collecting societies.120
However, joint administration of rights as advocated by the
Gowers review, has to surmount considerable hurdles. Often
different categories of right-holders are in an antagonistic
relationship 121 and the joint administration of their rights would
create issues as to: (1) who is represented on the board of the joint
management entities; (2) how would voting power be attributed to
the various right-holders; and (3) how would revenue be
distributed among the different right-holders. 122  In addition, at
least for copyright and related rights in the digital environment, the
117 See, e.g., Thierry Desurmont, The Future of Collective Licensing, in COLLECTIVE
LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 2, at 203, 205 (describing how
authors have very little power against powerful users).
118 GOWERS, supra note 45.
119 See id. at 94 (explaining that an agreement between collecting societies could benefit
users).
120 See HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 176. "To alleviate some of the problems
that arise with respect to the accumulation of rights in a single work, rights clearance
centres have been set up in various Member States .... This greatly facilitates the rights
clearance of multimedia works." Id.
121 See, e.g., VANHEUSDEN, supra note 47, at 34 (describing the relationship between
performing artists and their collecting societies on the one hand and record producers on
the other hand).
122 See, e.g., id. at 23. (Table 1.2 gives the rules on revenue allocation between
performing artists and record labels in the different E.U. Member States).
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structure and scope of exclusive rights is such that each right-
holder owns a specific right, even if these rights might overlap for
certain online transactions.
In these circumstances, the Recommendation did not argue for
transfer of presumptions of the ovemership or joint administration
of different rights that pertain to different right-holders. Rather,
this instrument focuses on practical issues on how to streamline the
current multi-layered management of copyright. 2
3
E. How Does the Recommendation Deal with the Online Rights?
The Recommendation refrains from inviting right-holders and
collecting societies from "consolidating" the management of
different exclusive rights. It takes a pragmatic approach in inviting
right-holders and their representatives to streamline the
management of "online" rights while acknowledging their distinct
and independent character.1
24
The Recommendation refers to the above rights as the relevant
"online" rights not in order to create new categories of rights, but
because these rights are already harmonized at Community level
with a view of facilitating cross-border exploitation of copyright
protected works or phonograms. 125  Therefore, the term "online
123 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54, 54 (EC), OJ
2005 L276/54 (Westlaw) (explaining how commercial users must negotiate in each
Member state, with each collective rights manager, for appropriate rights and stating the
"need for a licensing policy that corresponds to the ubiquity of the online environment
and which is multi-territorial").
124 See id. This view appears to be in line with Panel Report, United States-Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 6.173 WT/DS152/R (June 15, 2000) (asserting that
"in our view, normal exploitation would presuppose the possibility for right-holders to
exercise separately all three exclusive rights guaranteed under the three subparagraphs of
Article 1 lbis(1), as well as the rights conferred by other provisions, such as Article 11, of
the Berne Convention (1971)").
125 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, art. 1, at 55. See also Council
Directive 2001/29, recital 2, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 10 (EC), OJ 2001 L167/10 (Westlaw)
(stating that an earlier European Council meeting "stressed the need to create a general
and flexible legal framework at Community level in order to foster the development of
the information society in Europe. This requires, inter alia, the existence of an internal
market for new products and services.").
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rights" refers to those categories that are already present in the
relevant body of Community directives.'
26
According to the Recommendation, the following exclusive
rights are implicated in the provision of protected works or other
subject matter electronically at a distance.
1. The Exclusive Right of Reproduction
This right is defined in Article 2 of the Directive 127 and "covers
all reproductions made in the process of ... online distribution.'
128
The right of reproduction includes the right to reproduce the work
by making intangible copies. 129  Intangible copies include those
made by digital means;' 30 for example, upload and download,
transmission in a network, or storage on a hard disk. Certain
temporary copies are, however, exempted from the reproduction
right by virtue of Article 5(3)(1) of the Directive.' 31
126 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737 at 55 ("'[O]nline rights' means any of
the following rights: (i) the exclusive right of reproduction that covers all reproductions
provided for under Directive 2001/29/EC in the form of intangible copies, made in the
process of online distribution of musical works; (ii) the right of communication to the
public of a musical work, either in the form of a right to authorise or prohibit pursuant to
Directive 2001/29/EC or a right to equitable remuneration in accordance with Directive
92/100/EEC, which includes webcasting, internet radio and simulcasting or near-on-
demand services received either on a personal computer or on a mobile telephone; (iii)
the exclusive right of making available a musical work pursuant to Directive 2001/29/EC,
which includes on-demand or other interactive services.").
127 Council Directive 2001/29, art. 2, at 16.
128 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, at 55.
129 See id. (stating that the exclusive right of reproduction provided in Directive 2001/29
applies to "intangible copies"); see also Directive 2001/29, art. 2, at 16 (stating that the
reproduction right applies to a production "in any form").
130 Follow-Up of the Commission of the European Communities to the Green Paper and
Related Rights in the Information Society, at 12, COM (96) 568 final (Nov. 20, 1996),
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/939/01/copyright-gp-follow COM 96_568.pdf
[hereinafter Follow-Up to Green Paper] (stating that the Commission sought to "define
the exact scope of the acts protected by the reproduction right . . [and] clarify that the
digitisation of works and other protected matter, as well as other acts such as scanning, or
uploading and downloading of digitised material are, in principle, covered by the
reproduction right. It would also cover for the same reasons, transient or other ephemeral
acts of reproduction.").
131 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(3)(1), at 16.
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European courts tend to interpret the scope of the reproduction
right widely and in a way that covers many activities taking place
on the Internet. In a case concerning a personalised video
recording service, the Cologne Court of Appeal held that both (1)
digitizing the captured signal and (2) storage of that signal on the
defendant's server constituted infringing reproductions.' 32 The
defendant operated a website that allowed subscribers to view the
programmes of 20 German broadcasters at a time and place
individually chosen by the subscribers. In order to offer such a
service, the defendant captured the broadcaster's signals and stored
a digitized version of these signals on its server. Each subscriber
then was allocated a space on the defendant's server, the so-called
personal video recorder (PVR). In Copiepresse v. Google,133 a
collecting society representing French and German language
newspaper publishers brought an action for copyright infringement
against Google on the grounds that Google's cache memory
enabled users to access press articles which were no longer
available for free on publishers' web-sites. The Google cache
memory enables the users to search and display the contents of a
web-page by clicking on the link "cached," even if the original
page is no longer accessible (the cache version displays the
contents of a web-site as last visited by the Google indexation
robot). The Brussels Court of First Instance held that copying and
storage of news articles and press photographs in the cache
memory of Google servers infringed the reproduction right. The
copy of a web-page stored in the memory of Google servers and
the display of a link making the cached copy accessible to the
public were held to constitute a material reproduction of protected
works. While Google argued that it reproduced only the HTML
code and not the images, the court reasoned that the only relevant
fact was that a fixation of the webpage, in whatever form, had
occurred. The Court thus held that authorization of the
132 Oberlandesgericht (K6ln) (6 U 133/05) (September 9, 2005), GRUR-
Rechtsspechungs Report, 2006/1, p5- 7, for an English comment on this judgment, (2006)
17:2 Entertainment Law Review p. 17.
133 Google v. Copiepresse, Tribunal de lere instance de Bruxelles, Feb. 13, 2007.
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rightholders was needed 134 to operate such a fixation. According
to a German line of cases reproductions of small images on the
Internet, known as thumbnails infringe the images owners'
exclusive right of reproduction.' 35 In its "thumbnails" judgment,
the Regional Court of Hamburg held that storage of "thumbnails"
made available by a search engine on the Internet on a user's
computer in the German territory would entail the exclusive right
of reproduction as guaranteed by the German Copyright Code
(Urheberrechtsgesetz). Although it was each user who triggered
the copy when visiting the search engine's website, the search
engine was held to have "initiated" the reproduction by making the
thumbnails available on a website.
2. The Exclusive Right of Communication to the Public
This right is set out in Article 3 of the Directive and covers all
communications of authors' works to members of the public not
present at the place where the communication originates, such as
broadcasting, cable, and online transmissions. 136 As evidenced by
recital 23 of the Directive, this right does not cover local
communication to the public such as public performances,
recitations or the like.'
37
Apart from authors, only performers have an exclusive right of
communication to the public, but the performers' right is limited to
live performances only. 138 Performances that have already been
broadcast or broadcasts from earlier fixations are specifically
114 In the U.S., in Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp 2d. 1106 (D. Nev. 2006), a court found
that the making available of a cached copy amounted to fair use.
135 LG Bielefeld, Nov. 8, 2005, JurPC Web-Dok. 106/2006; LG Hamburg, Oct. 5, 2003,
JurPC Web-Dok 146/2004.
136 See id. art. 3. The Court of Justice had interpreted the notion of public as an
indeterminate number of potential spectators. Cf Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de
Autores y Editores de Espahia (SGAE) v. Rafel Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11519 37
(stating that "the term public[] refers to an indeterminate number of potential television
viewers").
137 Bechtold, supra note 35, at 360.
138 See Council Directive 92/100, art. 8(1), 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC), OJ 1992 L346/61
(Westlaw).
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excluded. 139  Arguably, performers therefore have no exclusive
right of communication to the public that would apply to the online
streaming of sound recordings.1 40  They do, however, have the
exclusive right of "making available," which would apply to online
downloads. 141
Some commentators appear to assume that the authors'
exclusive right of communication to the public only covers
situations where the transmitter determines the timing of the
communication.1 42  This would include webcasting,1
43
simulcasting, Internet radio, IPTV, and "near-on-demand"
139 See id. art. 8 (stipulating that performers and phonogram producers possess a right to
equitable remuneration with regard to broadcasting performances fixed in a commercial
program by wireless means, thereby excluding cable broadcasts). But see id. recital 20,
1992 O.J. (L346) (Westlaw) (stating that Member States are free to provide performers
broader protection and require "equitable remuneration" for cable or other wire-based
broadcasts, such as webcasting or simulcasting of broadcasts on the internet).
140 See id. art 8(1); Council Directive 2001/29, 25, 2001 O.J. (L 167) at 12. The
Copyright Directive grants neighbouring rights holders no exclusive right with respect to
services such as webcasting or simulcasting, which are not fully interactive. See Council
Directive 2001/29, recital 25, at 12. These rights are covered by national rules on
neighbouring rights. In most countries, phonogram producers and performers only enjoy
a right to receive equitable remuneration for the secondary use of phonograms, which
may include webcasting. With respect to broadcasting by wireless means-but not cable-
casting, simulcasting or webcasting-Directive 92/100, therefore, requires Member
States to provide at least a right to ensure that equitable remuneration is paid for the
secondary use of a phonogram by a broadcaster.
141 See discussion infra Part 5.5.3.
142 Compare Bechtold, supra note 35, at 361 (positing that "[i]f the work is offered in a
way that the member of the public does not have individual control over when and from
where to access the work (for example, normal TV and radio broadcasting, streaming
content over the Internet, Internet radio stations and possibly near-on-demand pay TV),
the right of making available to the public does not apply"), with GUIBAULT ET AL., supra
note 55, at 28 ("[I]t is difficult to give a definite interpretation of what constitutes 'on
demand,' i.e. delivery at a time and place individually chosen by the user .... Precisely
what level of interactivity it implies is not quite clear. In practice, dissemination on-line
is done through models along a sliding scale of interactivity.").
143 See Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 6 n.1. "A simulcast is a 'simultaneous
broadcast', and refers to programs or events broadcast across more than one medium at
the same time. Streaming allows data to be transferred in a stream of packets that are
interpreted as they arrive for 'just-in-time' delivery of multimedia information. A
webcast is similar to a broadcast television program but designed for internet
transmission. A person/computer receiving information via a computer refers to it as a
download. Online music provided on demand is a downloading service of musical works
on demand against or without payment." Id.
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services. 144  Communication to the public would occur
irrespectively of whether musical works are communicated via
personal computers, a television set or mobile telephones. In the
"multi-channel" case, the Court of Appeal in Munich held that the
transmission of music tracks without any commentary or
advertising via cable and satellite was to be cleared as a
communication to the public (broadcast transmission) and not as a
non-physical delivery of music tracks, a form of online
exploitation, which would nowadays have to be cleared under the
"making available" right. 145
3. The Exclusive Right of "Making Available"
This right covers fully interactive "on-demand" services, such
as making a work available by allowing for its downloading.
146
The "making" available right also seems to apply to downloading
on a portable device, such as "podcasting"'' 47. As opposed to the
144 But see Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, COM (1998) 628 final (Jan. 21, 1998), E.U.: COM(97) 628 (Westlaw)
[hereinafter Proposal] (stating that near-video-on-demand, pay-per-view and pay-TV are
not acts of making available).
145 Judgment of 20 April 2000 - Case no. 6 U 3729/99.
146 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10,16 (EC), OJ 2001
L167/10 (Westlaw); see also Follow-Up to Green Paper, supra note 130, at 13 (stating
Member State preference "to cover 'on-demand' transmissions-without prejudice to any
acts of reproduction which are covered by a separate right - by a widely interpreted form
of a right of communication to the public"). Electronic delivery would therefore form
part of the family of "communication to the public" rights and not part of the family of
other rights, such as the distribution right. The aim was to grant this right of
communication to the same beneficiaries who enjoy the exclusive right of reproduction in
the same digital environment. The stated objective was therefore that both the right of
reproduction and the right of communication to the public would coexist alongside each
other. But see Proposal, supra note 144 (stating in regard to protecting "on demand"
transmission, "[i]n economic terms, the interactive on-demand transmission is a new
form of exploitation of intellectual property. In legal terms, it is generally accepted that
the distribution right, which only applies to the distribution of physical copies does not
cover the act of transmission.").
147 Dr. Joachim v.Ungem-Stemberg, in URHEBERRECHT KOMMENTAR para. 20 n.46, at
403 (Professor Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Gerhard Schricker ed., C.H. Beck'sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung 1999) (1987). There are estimates that "50% of mobile content
revenues will be from music." IFPI 2005, supra note 70, at 3. Music services provided to
mobile telephones also include the market for ring-tones and real-tones. See id. at 8.
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exclusive right of communication to the public, which is only
granted to authors, the "making available" right is accorded to
authors, performers and record producers. 1
48
It is, in particular, the right to "make available" works or other
subject matter "in such a way that members of the public may
access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them" that has introduced the "digital agenda" to copyright
policy. 149 The "making available" right, as it is known, is a right
formulated with the Internet and cross-border exploitation of
copyright in mind and thus most closely reflects the potential of
the online environment and "on-demand" services made available
online. 150
In the realm of Internet services, the "making available" right
was tailored to cover not only permanent "downloads"-potential
substitutes for retail sales-but also "on-demand" streaming of
works that can be permanently stored in the process.' 5 ' The
legislative history of the Directive is very clear on this point. In
the Explanatory Memorandum of the original proposal for the
Directive, the Commission states:
A range of such 'on-demand' services has already
emerged in the European market, starting in 1995
and 1996, particularly in the United Kingdom,
France and Germany, although still at the prototype
or trial stage. Interactive 'on-demand' services are
characterised by the fact that a work or other subject
matter stored in digital format is made permanently
available to third parties interactively, i.e. in such a
way that users may order from a database the music
or film they want; this is then relayed to their
computer as digital signals over the Internet or other
high-speed networks, for display or for
148 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 3, at 16.
149 Id.
150 See Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espafia (SGAE) v.
Rafael Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11519.
151 See Proposal, supra note 144.
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downloading, depending on the applicable
licence. 152
Interestingly enough, this remains a valid description of the
online market for music or film "downloads." Downloads are still
the predominant way in which consumers access music online.1 5
3
The Memorandum also shows that the Commission, already in
1997, had in mind to deal specifically with online delivery of
music or films-activities which were already known at that time.
There appears to be an emerging trend to interpret the "making
available" right broadly. The Court of Appeal in Hamburg
recently ruled that an act of making phonograms available did not
even require that the download of a copy of the phonogram.
54
The court qualified an act of on-demand streaming as covered by
the "making available" right. 155  The Court, by qualifying the
"making available" as a sub-set of the right of "communication to
the public", concluded that "making available" of a sound
recording did not require that the user obtained or retained
'possession' of a download. In another case, the Court of Appeal
in Cologne ruled that an Internet service provider's offer to save
selected digitized television programmes for the user's deferred
viewing constituted an act of "making available. 156 The use of
peer-to-peer software to distribute works over the Internet has also
been held to be covered by the right to make available. In Polydor
Ltd and others v Brown and others,'57 proceedings were brought in
the High Court of England and Wales against an Internet user who
had used peer-to-peer software to offer more than four-hundred
files for download. Under section 20 of the UK Copyright, Designs
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 See The Rise of Online Music in Europe, supra note 61, at 13 ("Music is being
consumed in increasingly diverse ways, ranging from ringtones to free-to-listen and
podcasts. However, the digital retail model continues to dominate as it has since...
2004.").
154 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeal] July 7, 2005, Case No 5 U 176/04
BeckRS 2005 09130.
155 Id.
156 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeal] Oct. 9September 2005 Case No 6 U
90/05 BeckRS 2005 12216.
157 [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch.D.).
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and Patents Act 1988,158 communication to the public includes
broadcasting and "making available" to the public of the work by
"electronic transmission."'" 159  The judge held that connecting a
computer running P2P software to the Internet, and in which music
files are stored in a shared directory, falls within section 20. The
mere fact that the files were present and made available was
sufficient to constitute infringement of this section. Similarly, the
Dublin High Court held that peer-to peer software allowed
copyright infringement by "making available" to the public a
significant volume of sound recordings. 60  This case law may
reflect the fact that the "making available" right is the one right
formulated in the Directive that specifically had Internet-based
services and online infringements in mind.
The above jurisprudence appears significant. Internet radio
services that would traditionally be considered as web-casting or
streaming-type services are increasingly competing with
interactive services or "electronic retail" services, as envisaged by
the "making available" right. For example, filtering software
might well enable listeners of digital radio to screen a broadcast so
as to obtain recordings which can later be digitally stored on
mobile listening devices. The digital storage of selected songs
would then fall under the "making available" right. 161
158 An unofficial, consolidated version of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
is available at: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/copy/c-law/c-legislation.htm.
159 Cf. Section 20(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988: "References in
this Part to communication to the public are to communication to the public by electronic
transmission, and in relation to a work include--(a) the broadcasting of the work; (b) the
making available to the public of the work by electronic transmission in such a way that
members of the public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them."
160 EMI Sony Universal and others v. Eirecom, BT Ireland [2006] ECDR 5, Dublin
High Court, July 8, 2005. The proceedings were brought against the ISP for disclosure of
information regarding certain customers, and the existence of copyright infringement was
not challenged.
161 Such a service was the subject of a recent German judgment by the Regional Court
in Cologne in Case 28 0 16/07, judgment of 28 February 2007, BeckRS 2007 04401. In
the case at issue, the service provider digitally stored radio programmes for later listening
at a time chosen by its subscribers. This element of the service was offered for free.
However, the service provider charged a subscription fee of €0.99 per day, if the online
subscriber decided to download more than five tracks of the stored radio programmes per
day. For a monthly fee of E2.99, the user could download an unlimited number of music
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F. Is a More Granular Approach Necessary in Defining
"Online" Rights?
As seen above, the Recommendation defines "online" rights by
reference to the harmonized terminology used in the E.U.
directives. 162  In line with the E.U. directives, "the
Recommendation defines the types of rights in terms of the legal
qualification of the right,"' 63 using the terminology of the relevant
directives.164  "The Recommendation does not address the
[potential] necessity for collective rights managers to further define
the categories of 'online rights' by (1) specific forms of ['near-on-
demand'] exploitation"--e.g., . . . webcasting, IPTV, mobile
transmissions, mobile television, video-on-demand, etc or (2) by
reference to the type of ['on-demand'] service offered (e.g.,
"download-to-own" or subscription-based services). 165  Further
monitoring must determine whether it was correct that the
Recommendation used the term "online rights" in a way that
refrained from defining specific forms of exploitation or even
specific services that are offered online.
It might become necessary-for example, when rights are
assigned to a rights manager-to further delineate "online" rights
according to forms of exploitation. For example, right-holders
may well wish to be able to assign some forms of exploitation, e.g.
some types of online service, to a collecting society while retaining
other forms of exploitation without assigning them to a collective
rights manager. This might become relevant for users of Creative
Commons licenses, according to which only some forms of use
may be reserved while other forms of exploitation are allowed.
This "some rights reserved" approach makes it difficult for
collecting societies to manage Creative Commons licensed
tracks. As the service provider had failed to clear copyright for the use of the sound
recordings, the court mentioned a possible infringement the right of 'making available'
but left the matter unresolved because it held that, in any case, the service infringed the
reproduction right in the sound recording.
162 See supra note 126.
163 Call for Comments, supra note 87, at 2.
16' See generally Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54, 54
(EC), OJ 2005 L276/54 (Westlaw).
165 Call for Comments, supra note 87, at 2.
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works. 166  It is alleged that collecting societies' current
management mandates do not provide right-holders the possibility
to exclude specific forms of exploitation from the scope of
collective management.' 6 7 Therefore, artists who are members of
collecting societies often remain unable to use a Creative
Commons license. The same might be true for the purposes of the
withdrawal of rights. Rightholders may wish to withdraw only
certain forms of exploitation while leaving others to be managed
collectively.
168
The principle of a more granular delineation of rights for the
purposes of withdrawal from and entrustment of these rights to
collecting societies has been studied recently in the rapport Levy-
Jouyet on l'V&onomie de l'immatriel. 169 The report advocates that
right-holders have the choice to withdraw all of their rights or only
certain categories or forms of exploitation from collective
managers.1 70  The third principle of the French recommendations
goes even further in advocating that even a commercial user be
given the choice to license only certain repertoire or "types of
music" that he finds interesting-as opposed to receiving a
166 See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 45, at § 5.66 ("Collecting Societies in the U.K.
generally hold an exclusive license to collect royalties for the copyright works that they
represent. Therefore, artists who are members of collecting societies are generally unable
to license Creative Commons licensed individual works."). But see Euan Lawson, Live
Performances: Collecting Societies and the Public Performance Right, in COLLECTIVE
LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 2, at 89, 93 (stating that the
Performing Right Society Ltd. ("PRS") in the United Kingdom does allow members to
"contract out of exclusivity for particular live concert tours where the composer or
publisher concerned can generate a royalty of £1,000 or more per event").
167 See Things to Consider Regarding Creative Commons Licensing,
http://creativecommons.org/about/think (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
168 This issue is addressed in Call for Comments, supra note 87, at 2 ("[S]hould
rightholders be able to retain some types of use or forms of exploitation without assigning
them to a collective rights manager?").
169 See generally Rapport de la Commission sur l'&conomie de l'immat~riel, Minefi
(December 2006), available at http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/directionsservices/sircom/
technologies-info/immateriel/immateriel.pdf [hereinafter Rapport de la Commission].
70 Id. at 129 ("Premier principe, le cr~ateur doit rester maitre de ses droits. Comme
c'est d~jA le cas dans certaines soci~t~s telle la SACD, libre droit pour les cr~ateurs de
sortir des soci~t~s au bout d'un d~lai qui ne saurait d~passer deux ans ; aucune autre
fonnalit6 ou condition n'est opposable A la demande, la sortie pouvant porter sur
l'ensemble des droits ou sur certains d'entre eux seulement.").
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"blanket license"' 17 1 covering all types of music. It is interesting to
note that the report therefore seems to favor granular choice both at
right-holders' and at users' levels.
G. The Relationship Between Broadcasting and "Online " Rights
One form of exploitation that is not included in the
Recommendation is broadcasting, including transmissions or
retransmission by cable or satellite.' 72  This is because
broadcasting and satellite or cable transmissions are not considered
forms of "online" retail or "downloading" of music. The reason
for this is as follows.
For broadcasters, music has a function and value that may be
different from the value of music for an online retail store. While
online retail stores sell music downloads to the general public as
their primary line of business, broadcasters only use music as
background to their scheduled programmes. In other words, an
online shop selling music is active on the "primary" music market,
while a broadcaster exploits music on a "secondary" market.
The Recommendation aims to facilitate E.U.-wide licensing for
the primary market for music downloads. 173  It may appear less
tailored to creating new licensing models for the "secondary
market" when music is used incidentally as background in
broadcast programmes.' 74 In this latter case, most jurisdictions in
171 Id. ("Troisi~me principe, l'utilisateur doit pouvoir choisir la fraction du repertoire
pour laquelle il souhaite obtenir une licence. L'utilisateur pourrait ainsi n'obtenir une
licence que sur une partie du catalogue g~r6 par ]a SPRD. Pour &viter une gestion trop
fine de ces licences partielles, une < partie )> pourrait ne s'appliquer qu'd un type de
musique ou A un ayant droit plut6t que titre par titre et il reviendrait i l'utilisateur de
mettre en place les outils de v&rification n6cessaires d la SPRD. Dans tous les cas, le prix
de la licence partielle ne saurait d6passer le montant d'une licence complete.").
172 See generally Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54 (EC),
OJ 2005 L276/54 (Westlaw).
173 See the early focus on "pay-per-download" services in Community Initiative, supra
note 41, at 6. "In 2004, online music revenue in Western Europe amounted to E27.2
million (23.4 million attributable to "downloads" and C3.8 million to subscription-based
services). The U.S. market amounted to 6207 million (E155.9 million attributable to
downloads and E51.1 million to subscription-based services)." Id.
174 See generally Commission Recommendation 2005/737. As mentioned above, this
"secondary market," in many E.U. Member States, is not covered by an exclusive right,
at least as far as performing artists and phonogram producers are concerned. See supra
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the Community grant phonogram producers and performing artists
only a right to claim "equitable remuneration."'' 75  In these
circumstances, traditional territorial rights management might well
persist.
176
As terrestrial broadcasting, satellite transmissions or cable
retransmissions are not covered by the Recommendation, debate
has arisen on how broadcasters or satellite operators should license
the "on-demand" "making available" of earlier broadcasts for later
viewing. 7  Some commentators argue that the "on-demand"
delivery of scheduled programming is a form of "time shifting."'
178
This would imply that later viewing, even at a time individually
chosen by the viewer, should be covered by the-often national-
broadcast license. On the other hand, should the later
programming viewed "on-demand" be covered by the "making
available" right, broadcasters would benefit from the option of
E.U.-wide right clearance as stipulated by the Recommendation.
This is because the "making available" right is the only right that
has a true pan-European vocation and is arguably the easiest right
to administer at the E.U. level. In this way, on-demand versions of
broadcasts could be transmitted for an audience that is wider than
the original broadcast.
The Recommendation does not specifically address the issue of
how broadcasters license "on-demand" use of scheduled
note 139. The "equitable remuneration" due for the use of a commercial phonogram in
broadcasting is administered at a national level.
175 See supra note 139.
176 See HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 220-21 (suggesting that "[o]ne
possibility, which would comply with the Commission's current policy of creating a
Community-wide market for online rights, would be to create a distinction between
traditional rights of public performance and broadcasting that might remain territorial ...
and rights of making available online that need not be managed locally and would
become Community-wide").
177 The practical significance of this debate lies in its repercussion on E.U. right
clearance. See GUIBAULT ET AL., supra note 55, at 27. While broadcasting licenses or
remuneration schemes are administered collectively, the phonogram producer's rights
involved in "on demand" services are cleared individually. See id. at 25-27.
178 See id. at 27 (defining "time-shifting" as "view[ing] or listen[ing] to content at a time
other than that of the original delivery" and suggesting that "[d]igital video recorders
greatly enhance this capacity [to time-shift] and also offer other control over content, e.g.
allowing the user to pause or fast forward through a broadcast").
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programme content. 79 If the "on-demand" service covers a wider
territory than the initial broadcast, a separate E.U.-wide or multi-
territorial license might be the cheaper option.
Some broadcasters might, however, be able to demonstrate that
the audience interested in programmes made available "on-
demand" after the initial broadcast has taken place is located in the
same territory as the one watching the scheduled programme. In
this case, negotiations could take place to include the "on-demand"
time-shifts in the original broadcast license. This is an issue that
parties will have to decide when negotiating the broadcast license.
VI. How ARE "ONLINE" RIGHTS LICENSED?
A. Reciprocal Representation Agreements
Cross-border cooperation among E.U. collecting societies for
the exploitation of works that are in the repertoire of a particular
E.U. society by a society in another Member State is conducted via
"reciprocal representation agreements."' 80 As the above groups of
right-holders-authors, composers, publishers, performers, and, for
"secondary uses,"' 81 also the record companies-"tend to entrust
their rights to collective rights management societies established in
their home territory, these right-holder[s'] [sic] works become[]
179 See generally Commission Recommendation 2005/737; see also Call for Comments,
supra note 87, at 2 ("The Recommendation defines the types of rights in terms of the
legal nature of the right. The Recommendation does not address the necessity for
collective rights managers to further define the categories of "online rights" by (1) type of
use or (2) form of exploitation.").
180 See Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 8 & n.10 ("The term "reciprocal" in the
context of these private agreements means 'in return for [sic] an identical grant'. It does
not connote 'reciprocity' for which there is a specific meaning in international law
especially in the international copyright conventions i.e. where rights are granted by one
country to its nationals, the nationals of another country can only have the benefit of
those rights where there is commensurate recognition of these rights by the other
country.").
181 The right to equitable remuneration if commercial phonograms are broadcast by
wireless means or communicated to the public as contained in Council Directive
92/100/EEC is a secondary use of a commercial phonogram. See Council Directive
92/100, art. 8(2), 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC), OJ 1992 L346/61 (Westlaw).
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[sic] part of the repertoire of the collecting society in the territory
where [they are] domiciled (the 'management society')."'182
"If copyright works are [performed or sold online] in another
territory, the [collecting] society active in that territory (the
'affiliated society') will enter into reciprocal agreements with the
management society" that manages the work at issue. 83 This
allows the affiliated society to commercially exploit the
management society's repertoire, but only in its own territory.'
84
The management society still remains empowered to exercise the
rights to this repertoire in its own territory and is able to entrust
other societies to manage its repertoire in their respective
territories. 185 In effect, this means that along with its own national
repertoire, an affiliate always obtains the right to license, in its own
territory, the repertoire of the management society with which it
has a bilateral arrangement.
Via a network of bilateral reciprocal agreements, each local
collective rights manager represents both its own repertoire and the
repertoire of the collective with which has entered into a bilateral
reciprocal agreement. But the representation mandate of the
affiliated society is always limited to its national territory. 86
In order to facilitate the creation of a network of the above
bilateral reciprocal agreements, collective societies have formed
alliances-e.g., CISAC 187 for authors' rights in musical works,
BIEM 188 for authors' rights in mechanical reproduction, and
182 Study on Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 9.
183 Id.
184 Id. See also Lawson, supra note 166, at 91, for a brief discussion of the implications
of reciprocal agreements ("Performing right societies have. .. developed networks of
interlocking agreements by which music is cross-licensed between societies in different
states. In this way, so the theory goes, the composer can sit at home and watch all of his
income flow back through his membership of one society.").
185 See Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 9.
186 See Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 6.
87 CISAC is the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers.
See Rigg, supra note 109, at 22. It was founded in 1926 and initially represented
eighteen collecting societies from eighteen countries. Id. Membership was limited to
authors' societies. Id. The organization currently includes 200 societies from ninety-
eight countries, representing over 2 million authors. Id.
188 BIEM, the Bureau International des Soci~trs Grrant Les Droits d'Enregistrement et
de Reproduction Mcanique, was established in 1929 by Alphonse Toumier and currently
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SCAPR and IMAE'89 for performers' rights in musical works.
Most collective societies belong to one of the principal umbrella
organizations mentioned above. These alliances have led to model
agreements which cover cross-border licensing, collecting and
distribution of royalties.' 90  On the basis of these model
agreements, collective societies have concluded bilateral reciprocal
representation agreements.' 91
Cross-border collective management of the rights thus entails
management services that one collective rights manager, the
affiliate society, provides on behalf of another collective rights
manager, the management society.' 92  However, the model
agreements and the corresponding bilateral reciprocal
representation agreements apply a series of restrictions which are
contrary to the fundamental E.U. principle that services, including
collective management of copyright or individual services
associated with the collective management of copyright, should be
provided across national borders without restriction based on
nationality, residence, or place of establishment. 
193
represents forty-one societies in thirty-eight countries. See id. at 23. The organization
negotiates a standard agreement with representatives of the recording industry (IFPI). Id..
See also Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 12-13 (analyzing CISAC and BIEM
model representation agreements).
189 SCAPR is the Societies' Council for the Collective Management of Performers'
Rights and IMAE is the Institut pour la tutelle des artistes-interprtes et excutants. See
Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 13 (defining SCAPR and IMAE, and analyzing
their respective model agreements and restrictive provisions).
190 See Rigg, supra note 109, at 22-24 (stating the role collective societies serve in
issuing agreements and the functions of such societies according to the WIPO).
191 See Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 9.
192 See id.
193 Id. The Court of Justice has dealt with, and essentially accepted as compatible with
the anti-cartel provisions of the EC Treaty, reciprocal representation agreements in the
context of licensing of physical premises. See, e.g., Case 395/87, Minist~re Public v.
Jean-Louis Toumier, 1989 E.C.R. 2521, para. 16-24; Joined Cases 110/241 & 242/88
1989 Lucazeau v. Socit des Auteurs, Compositeurs et tditeurs de Musique (SACEM),
1989 ECR 2811. There is no jurisprudence on whether such provisions would also be
allowed for online licensing. Nor is there jurisprudence on how such provisions affect
the freedom to provide and receive cross-border services.
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B. Transaction Costs in Reciprocal Arrangements
"The current practice of collective management of copyright on
a national territorial basis ... requires that each commercial user
obtain a license from each and every relevant collective rights
manager in each territory of the E.U. in which the work is
accessible."'
194
In order for these reciprocal representation
agreements to cover at least the aggregate repertoire
of all European collective societies for one
particular form of exploitation of one particular
right in all European territories-e.g. the making
available right that has to be cleared to sell musical
works online-it is necessary that European
collective societies conclude among themselves a
minimum of 351 bilateral reciprocal representation
agreements. 
95
This figure is based on the hypothesis that there would be a
minimum of one collecting society per Member State that is
responsible for the "making available right."'' 96 This society would
have to have a reciprocal representation agreement with all twenty-
six other societies that administer this right in the other Member
States.' 97
In order to determine the minimum total number of bilateral
combinations necessary among twenty-seven European collecting
societies, one needs to calculate the number of agreements among
each of the twenty-seven entities-as "management societies"-
with each of the other twenty-six societies-as "affiliate
societies"-i.e., 27 x 26 = 702. However the result must be
divided by two because the agreement between societies A and B
194 Community Initiative, supra note 41, at 8.
195 See id.
196 See id. (stating that each Member State would be represented by one collective
society for each right). The study employs a different number because there were fewer
Member States in 2005, but the principle behind the calculation is constant.
197 See id. Of course, in reality there is more than one collecting society in each
Member State as often each category of fight-holder is administered by a separate society
and sometimes a particular right (reproduction) is administered by a society distinct from
that which administers the right to communicate to the public.
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is the same as the agreement between societies B and A-i.e., 702/
2 = 351. Maintaining this network of reciprocal arrangements
among twenty-seven societies comes at a considerable
management cost.
The description above shows that legal complications, more
than technical hurdles, stand in the way of an efficient and
seamless online licensing of protected works. That is because the
arrangements in which copyright and related rights are managed
never contemplated the plethora of new platforms of distribution
that have emerged in the digital era. Indeed, there were no digital
services when reciprocal arrangements that bind each collecting
society to limit its activities to its national territory were set up.
198
As reciprocal arrangements tend to oblige the partner collectives to
limit their activities to one particular territory, they do not
accommodate international business models. But most of the
above-mentioned new digital services are potentially international
in scope and therefore need to clear music rights in order to operate
legally.
In several E.U. jurisdictions, releasing or re-releasing music on
the Internet on an international scale is not covered in the
traditional licensing of musical works. 199 This means that online
198 The first collecting society for copyright in musical works was the French Socit6
des auteurs, compositeurs et 6diteurs de musique (SACEM). SACEM was established in
1851 and collected royalties for the public performance of music in bars, cafes and other
local concert venues. See Rigg, supra note 109, at 19. SACEM, at times, collected
royalties for the French repertoire it represented in Switzerland, Belgium and the United
Kingdom. About SACEM, http://www.sacem.fr (follow "English" hyperlink; then follow
"SACEM" hyperlink; then follow "History" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 14, 2007). The
practice of direct collection only ceased once the United Kingdom, in 1914, established
its own society, the Performing Rights Society (PRS), which then collected on behalf of
the French repertoire in the United Kingdom. Rigg, supra note 109, at 22. ("SACEM had
caused resentment in Britain by attempting to enforce direct payment for the performance
of French works in Britain. Instead of collecting directly, it made sense for SACEM to
enter into arrangements with the U.K. societies to collect the U.K. income streams from
the use of French works and vice versa."). The practice of reciprocal representation
agreements was born. For a brief review of the history of collective rights management,
see Martin Kretschmer, The Failure of Property Rules on Collective Administration:
Rethinking Copyright Societies as Regulatory Instruments, 24(3) EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 126, 129 (2002).
199 See, e.g., Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG][German Copyright Act], May 8, 1998, § 31
no.4 (F.R.G.) (stating that an assignment of rights for new (future) types and means of
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music stores or broadcasters who want to offer services on the
Internet need to return to the authors' societies and the record
companies to renegotiate licensing contracts or conclude new ones
for the new digital platforms. Instead of negotiating Internet or
mobile use on an E.U.-wide basis, the clearance of rights was again
done territory-by-territory. But territorial rights management has
an effect on the timeline of the launching of online services.
2 0 0
C. Reciprocal Arrangements in the Online Environment
Due to the technical accessibility of an online service
throughout the European territories, providers of online services
require multi-territorial licenses for all of the "online" rights
mentioned above.20 1  The market segment in which this appears
most important is the growing market in interactive and on-
exploitation which were not known at the time the contract was drafted is considered null
and void). The aim of this provision is to protect authors against buy-outs for such new
and unknown forms of exploitation and to prevent authors from losing revenue associated
with these forms of exploitation. There is a certain trend to relax the strict interpretation
of this provision. Recently, the German Supreme Court held that exploitation of a film
on DVD did not constitute a new form of exploitation. See Giunter Poll, New Types of
Exploitation "The Magic Mountain" on DVD, 28(6) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 355, 355
(2006).
200 The iTunes music store and its staggered introduction can be cited as evidence in this
respect. This service was launched on 28 April 2003 in the all of the U.S. Apple
Launches the iTunes Music Store, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/apr/
28musicstore.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2007) There was no single launch date for the
European Union in 2003. Instead, the service was introduced over a year later in the
United Kingdom, Germany and France on 15 June 2004. Apple Launches iTunes Music
Store in the UK, France & Germany, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/jun/
l5itunes.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007). Consumers in Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Greece had to wait until 26
October 2004. Apple Launches EU iTunes Music Store, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/
2004/oct/26itmseu.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007). In Denmark, Norway and Sweden
the service only became available on 10 May 2005-over two years after the U.S. launch
date. iTunes Music Store Launches in Denmark, Norway, Sweden & Switzerland,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2005/may/10itms.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2007). It
appears that iTunes is still not available in some of the 10 States that joined the
Community in May 2004, such as Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland or the
Czech Republic. Download iTunes - Apple (UK and Ireland), http://www.apple.com/uk/
itunes/download/?ipod.html (see copyright notice indicating availability of iTunes Music
Store) (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
201 Commission of the European Communities, Decision No. 2003/300/EC, O.J. L
107/58 (2003).
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demand services 2° 2 with an array of options for the users which are
provided electronically at a distance. As mentioned above, most of
these services appear to be governed by the "making available"
right.2 °3 Ensuring that optimal conditions exist for the proper
management of the new "making available" right will ensure its
smooth transition into the marketplace.
Digital technology is fast rendering the old territorial system of
204managing intellectual property obsolete. New digital services
mean easier delivery than in the analogue era. This includes easier
delivery of services across the E.U. However, under the current
system, content destined for the entire continent's consumption
may be subjected to clearance twenty-seven times through twenty-
202 See The Rise of the Online Music Market, supra note 61.
203 See supra text accompanying Part I.E.3.
204 See, e.g., David Wood, Collective Management and E.U. Competition Law, in
COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 2, at 169, 170.
Indeed, the issues in the Tournier case were discussed on the basis of
a set of facts established in the early nineteen-eighties. Put simply,
this narrow interpretation is that given the practical impossibility for
a collecting society in one Member State to duplicate its necessary
monitoring and control activities in another Member State, collecting
societies are not competitors in respect of these activities ....
However, the question arises whether this analysis holds true if there
are users in respect of whom monitoring and enforcement activities
can feasibly be carried out by a collecting society in another Member
State .... We have been told that since there is a simultaneous
Internet broadcast or because the activity can be monitored by
telephone, there is no technical reason why the monitoring cannot be
carried out by a collecting society in another Member State to the
Member State of reception.
Id. Note, however that SACEM, the first European collecting society established in
1851, did not rely on reciprocal representation agreements to collect royalties on behalf
of the French repertoire in other territories than France. At times SACEM collected
royalties for the French repertoire it represented in Switzerland, Belgium and the United
Kingdom. The practice of direct collection only ceased once the United Kingdom, in
1914, established its own society, the Performing Rights Society (PRS), which then
collected on behalf of the French repertoire in the United Kingdom. See Rigg, supra note
109, at 22. As mentioned above, the main argument for reciprocal arrangements was
resentment of foreign societies attempting to enforce direct payments abroad and not the
duplication of monitoring and control activities. See id.; see also supra note 198
(discussing SACEM's attempt to enforce direct payment in Britain). This would cast
some doubt on the Tournier case law, even before electronic communications allowed for
"distance monitoring."
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seven different national authorities. For online operators this
constitutes a considerable administrative burden and in some
Member States popular online services are not even available. 20 5
Due to the technical accessibility of an online service
throughout the European territories, innovative content providers
require multi-territorial licenses as a way of insurance against
copyright infringement claims in the different jurisdictions in
which the services may be accessed.
D. How Would the Market Have Evolved Without the Online
Recommendation?
In 2005 the Commission reviewed how copyright and related
rights are being commercially exploited across the E.U.20 6 This
review focused on how the new "making available" right was
207 208licensed.20 7 Stakeholders were consulted in July 2005.
This exercise revealed that the current management
of [copyright in musical works and phonograms]-
within defined territories that usually are national
borders-is a source of considerable inefficiency.
And it also hinders the entry of new Internet-based
services that rely on [protected works and
phonograms].
Stakeholders [stated] that for most forms of
exploitation-in particular the new making
available right-the Internal Market has become the
appropriate [reference point]. The effect of
digitisation which allows a protected work to be
transmitted cross-border has been felt across all the
copyright industries. This implies that, in the
emerging multi-territorial environment of online
exploitation of copyright-protected works, access to
these works needs to be as efficient and simple as
205 See supra note 200.
206 See generally Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54, 54
(EC), OJ 2005 L276/54 (Westlaw).
2107 Id. at 55.
208 See Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 4.
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possible, while maximising the revenue that is
transferred to right-holders.
Stakeholders also stated that the ubiquity brought
about by the Internet, as well as the digital format of
products such as music files, are difficult to
reconcile with traditional reciprocal agreements.
The traditional reciprocal agreements among
collecting societies did not foresee the possibility
that the affiliated society would grant a licence
beyond its home territory. As a consequence, the
traditional reciprocal agreements require a
commercial user wishing to offer e.g.[,] a musical
work, online or offline to its clients to obtain a
copyright licence from every single relevant
national society.2 °9
Before issuing the Recommendation, the Commission looked
whether there were alternatives. 210 In particular, previous attempts
to amend traditional reciprocal agreements to make them a suitable
basis for supplying multi-territorial copyright licenses were
assessed.2'
Multi-territorial licensing has been introduced through the
Santiago Agreement for the authors' right of online communication
to the public including "making available" for the provision of
music downloading or streaming use of authors' rights.
21 2
209 Tilman Liider, Head of the Copyright Unit, European Commission, Working Toward
the Next Generation of Copyright Licenses, Speech Presented at the 14th Fordham
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy 13 (April 20-21, 2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/docs/lueder-fordham-
2006.pdf.
210 See Impact Assessment, supra note 41, passim.
211 Luder, supra note 209, at 13.
212 The Agreement was notified to the Commission in April 2001 by the collecting
societies of the U.K. (PRS), France (SACEM), Germany (GEMA), and the Netherlands
(BUMA), which were subsequently joined by all societies in the European Economic
Area-except for the Portuguese society SPA-as well as by the Swiss society (SUISA).
See Commission of the European Communities, Notice 2005/C200/05, O.J. C 200/11
(2005). See also http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/586
&format=-HTML&aged=0&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
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Multi-territorial licensing has been introduced via the
BIEM/Barcelona Agreement for online reproduction, which covers
webcasting, on demand transmission by acts of streaming and
downloading.2 13
But the structure put in place by the parties to the
Santiago and BIEM/Barcelona Agreements results
in commercial users being restricted in their choice
to the collecting society established in their own
Member State for the grant of the multi-territorial
licence. This restriction is described in the
Agreements as the so called "authority to licence"
and has the effect of allocating customers to the
local collective [in the territory where] . . . the
content provider has its economic residence or
URL[.] ... [The] "customer allocation clause" [is].
contrary to the fundamental freedom to seek
cross-border services .... 214
In addition, the Santiago Agreement expired at the end of 2004
and has not been renewed.2 5 This means that authors' rights
currently need to be cleared on a territory-by-territory basis.
Furthermore, authors' societies remain reluctant to adopt an E.U.-
wide licensing model. They argued that authors are best served by
213 For a description of both the "Santiago" and the "BIEM" agreements, see, Thierry
Desurmont, The Future of Collective Licensing, in COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST PRESENT
AND FUTURE, REPORTS PRESENTED AT THE MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, MIDEM 2002, CANNES, supra note 117, at 206. See also
Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 9.
214 Lider, supra note 209, at 14.
215 "According to GESAC [the European umbrella organization for authors' collecting
societies], the signatory societies to the Santiago and [BIEM/]Barcelona Agreements
chose not to extend them further in 2005, because although never having been the subject
of an official Commission decision, they were aware that the Commission was highly
critical of the so-called 'economic residence' clause in them, which was in GESAC's
opinion, necessary to prevent the risk of 'forum shopping' by commercial users. As a
result, GESAC acknowledges, authors' societies are only able to give copyright
exploiters clearance for the use of their own repertoire worldwide, and the world
repertoire within the territory in which they carry on their own activity." Impact
Assessment, supra note 41, at 9; see also Community Initiative, supra note 41.
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a collective rights manager with physical proximity to the user.216
Collecting societies argue that enforcement cannot properly be
provided at a distance, even with the use of digital technology.
VII. THE ONLINE RECOMMENDATION
This is why the European Commission, on 18 October 2005,
adopted a Recommendation on the management of online rights
(the "Recommendation").21 7 The Recommendation implies that
one way toward achieving E.U.-wide coverage is to aggregate
rights into attractive packages-"repertory. 218 This repertory can
then be licensed to online music shops by one collecting society on
an E.U.-wide basis in a single transaction. 219  Instead of twenty-
seven local licenses, the Recommendation seeks to foster a single
package comprising access to attractive repertoire at little
overhead.
216 The antitrust implications of territory-by-territory collective rights management are
addressed by David Wood. "Indeed, the issues in the Tournier case were discussed on
the basis of a set of facts established in the early nineteen-eighties. Put simply, this
narrow interpretation is that given the practical impossibility for a collecting society in
one Member State to duplicate its necessary monitoring and control activity in another
Member State, collecting societies are not competitors in respect of these activities ....
However, the question arises whether this analysis holds true if there are users in respect
of whom monitoring and enforcement activities can feasibly be carried out by a
collecting society in another Member State .... We have been told that since there is a
simultaneous Internet broadcast or because the activity can be monitored by telephone,
there is no technical reason why the monitoring cannot be carried out by a collecting
society in another Member State to the Member State of reception." Wood, supra note
204, at 169. See also Press Release, Groupement Europ~en des Soci6t6s d'Auteurs et
Compositeurs (July 7, 2005), available at http://www.gesac.org/ENG/NEWS/
COMMUNIQUESDEPRESSE/download/COMMUNIQUESEN_20050707_Collective%
20Management%20of20Copyright.doc.
217 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54 (EC), OJ 2005
L276/54 (Westlaw).
218 Id. at 56.
2 19 This solution is inspired by Ariel Katz, who describes the formation of "cleared
parcels" which greatly overcome fragmentation of copyright in a single song and thus
render licensing much more efficient. See generally Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of
Another Natural Monopoly: New Technologies and the Administration of Performing
Rights, 2(23) J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 245 (2006).
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A. Rightholders' Choice
In order to achieve this goal, the Recommendation stipulates
that right-holders should have the choice to authorize any existing
collecting society, or even a newly created licensing platform, with
managing their works directly across the entire E.U."2 ° Right-
holders' choice should offer the most effective model for cross-
border management because free choice gives right-holders an
incentive to entrust their repertoire to the best E.U.-wide licensing
platform available.2
In a first phase, existing societies or new licensing platforms
compete to be the authors', composers' or publishers' online
licensing platform of choice.222 They do this by offering an
efficient service, adopting a transparent policy on deductions and
governance and by offering negotiating skill and even clout vis-A-
vis commercial users.223
This first phase can be described as the "tender phase"-
existing or new societies compete vigorously to be selected as the
E.U.-wide music licensor of choice. Authors, composers and
publishers have the choice of either mandating one society with the
E.U.-wide management of their works or giving a mandate to
several societies who again compete to license the entrusted
repertoire to commercial users.22 4  In the "tender phase"
competition therefore takes place "upstream" when societies
compete for attractive repertoire. Naturally, authors or their
publishers are free to re-tender their repertoire in regular intervals.
220 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737 at 56.
221 See id. at 55.
222 In a series of decisions referring to the German colleting society GEMA, the
European Commission established the principle that any author should be free to assign
only particular categories of rights-e.g., public performance, broadcasting, mechanical
reproduction, and rights resulting from future technical developments or changes in the
applicable laws-for collective administration or withdraw such categories from
administration by GEMA. In particular, authors should be free to join collecting societies
in other Member States to manage their rights directly. See O.J. L 134/20 (2007); O.J. L
166/24 (2007).
223 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737 at 56.
224 Id.
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B. Users' Choice
In a second phase, as good quality service is measurable and a
reputation for good service travels quickly, this author expects that
an efficient licensing platform will quickly assemble an attractive
repertoire for E.U.-wide online licensing. In this second phase,
competition will shift "downstream" because societies, on the basis
of representing attractive repertoire, attempt to attract the business
of important online users.
This might well provide most authors, composers and
publishers with an incentive to pool their repertoire into a major
online licensing platform.225 To be commercially attractive, these
platforms could well be structured as "open platforms," which
means that smaller publishers or smaller collective societies can
pool their repertoire into the platform as well. If necessary, there
could be an obligation for major platforms to also include so-called
difficult or "niche" repertoire into the platform.
It would then appear possible that the new E.U. online
platforms could conclude "second tier" reciprocity arrangements
among themselves in order to create one "single entry point" for
E.U.-wide commercial users. This development would have an
added efficiency benefit because a single entry point among three
E.U. licensing platforms will come at a lower cost than a single
entry point that has to be organised among twenty-seven collective
societies.
C. Transaction Cost in the New Model
As stated above, the total number of bilateral combinations
necessary to create a single entry-point among twenty-seven
European collective societies would, by means of reciprocal
arrangements, be 351.226 Now, if you look at an online licensing
225 On January 21, 2007, the U.K. Music Publishers Association (MPA), representing
small and medium sized music publishers, announced that their repertoire would be
available for E.U.-wide online licensing through "Alliance digital," run by the U.K.
society MCPS/PRS. Press Release, The MCPS-PRS Alliance, MPA Unveils New Pan-
European Digital Licensing Solution (Jan. 21, 2007), available at http://www.mcps-prs-
alliance.co.uk/about us/press/latestpressreleases/mcpsprsalliance/Pages/MPA.aspx.
226 See supra text accompanying note 194-197.
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market that only comprises three societies-to be determined in
the competitive tendering process described above-only three
possible agreements among three entities-AB, BC and AC-
would be necessary to create a single entry point for E.U. licenses.
What is, however, most important with the proposed new
licensing platforms is that the emergence of these platforms will be
227the result of a competitive tendering process. This will be good
for enhancing or maintaining the value of copyright and related
rights in musical works. Allowing right-holders to choose a
collecting society outside their national territories for the E.U.-
wide licensing of the use made of their works considerably
enhances right-holders' earning potential.
In this way the Recommendation focuses on striking the right
balance between rewarding creators and fostering new digital
platforms for the delivery of music. 228 In lowering transaction
costs of access to protected content, it will not compromise right-
holders' income. Better management of rights across the E.U.
does not therefore need to lead to a "race to the bottom" with
respect to the value of musical works and IP protection for
creators.
VIII.GOVERNANCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The Recommendation also includes rules on governance,
transparency, dispute settlement, and accountability of collective
rights managers, whether they manage rights directly or by virtue
of reciprocal arrangements.
A. Governance
Governance is not an end in itself. The Recommendation is
based on the premise that governance rules setting out the duties
that collective rights managers owe to both right-holders and users
will introduce a culture of transparency and good governance.
229
227 See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
228 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737 at 55.
229 Id. The Commission agrees with this analysis and believes that Option 3 can create a
higher level of good governance and transparency for right-holders because the collective
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Better governance should stimulate E.U.-wide licensing and
promote the growth of legitimate online music services.
Certain collective rights managers have begun to implement
some of the provisions linked to governance-points 10-15 of the
Recommendation. 2 30 "In some cases, music publishers are being
offered greater representation on the board., 231 In other instances,
payments to right-holders, including music publishers, "switched
from a yearly to a quarterly basis." 232  There appears to be an
increased willingness to acknowledge or discuss deductions made
by the rights manager for purposes other than the management
services provided. The "rapport Levy-Jouyet" on "l'V&onomie de
l'immat~riel" also stresses the link between more competition and
better governance.233
B. Dispute Resolution
Closely linked to the issue of governance is the effectiveness of
dispute resolution. The Recommendation invites Member States to
provide for effective dispute resolution mechanisms at national
level.234 Effective dispute resolution should be available in
relation to (1) tariffs; (2) licensing conditions; (3) entrustment; and
(4) withdrawal of online rights. The applicable rules and
rights manager of their choice is accountable for all use made of works across the
Community and for the redistribution of royalties in exact proportion to this use. Impact
Assessment, supra note 41, at 37-38. "If the right-holder is not satisfied with the
functioning of the relationship he has the choice to seek Community-wide clearance
services elsewhere, a strong incentive to carry out optimal and transparent clearance and
royalty payment services. In these circumstances, in order to retain or attract business,
CRMs will have to adapt their business practices and become more efficient in relation to
their management of services." See Impact Assessment, supra note 41, at 2 1.
230 Luder, supra note 209, at 18.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Rapport de la Commission, supra note 169, at 129. ("Deuxi~me principe, les coits
de la gestion collective doivent ftre transparents. La qualit& des informations financi~res
transmises aux cr~ateurs doit 6tre am~lior~e, notamment sur les frais de gestion bruts, le
cofit des diff~rentes activit~s de collecte et les flux financiers entre soci~t~s. De meme, A
l'6gard des utilisateurs, les crit~res de calcul des droits i payer pour l'usage des ceuvres
g~r~es par la SPRD devraient etre affich~s sur le site des SPRD.").
234 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737 at 57.
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principles in relation to dispute resolution might need to be
strengthened in the future.
As evidenced by its "Call for Comments," the Commission is
now minded to assess whether the Recommendation brought about
changes in relation to transparency of rights management and
whether it increased the effectiveness of dispute resolution.235 It is
also necessary to assess whether the Recommendation brought
about sufficient safeguards for individual right-holders with
respect to (1) tariffs; (2) licensing conditions; (3) entrustment; and
(4) withdrawal of online rights. Further analysis will be necessary
to see whether the Recommendation should further address right-
holders participation in setting deductions for purposes other than
for the management services provided and whether it provides
sufficient safeguards for commercial users.
IX. FIRST EXPERIENCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION
First experience with the Recommendation shows that E.U.-
wide online licensing will be offered by newly created platforms
that are jointly operated by existing collecting societies. These
platforms pool several publishers' or societies' repertoires and
license them in one transaction across the E.U. 2 36  Recent
platforms include one for Anglo-American and German repertoires
237and another one for the French and Spanish repertoires. A
further announcement involves small and medium sized publishers
mandating a collecting society to set up an E.U. online licensing
platform for them.
238
235 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
236 Luider, supra note 209, at 17, 19.
237 On January 20, 2006, EMI Music Publishing and CELAS-a new online licensing
joint venture set up by GEMA and MCPSIPRS-signed the E.U.-wide licensing
arrangements. On January 20, 2006, the French society SACEM and the Spanish society
SGAE announced the setting up of a joint venture for the E.U.-wide licensing of their
respective repertoires. Id. at 18.
238 On January 21, 2007, the U.K. Music Publishers Association (MPA), representing
small and medium sized music publishers, announced that their repertoire would be
available for E.U.-wide online licensing through "Alliance digital," run by the U.K.
society MCPS/PRS. See Press Release, The MCPS-PRS Alliance, supra note 225.
[Vol. 18
THE NEXT TEN YEARS IN E. U. COPYRIGHT
In addition, emerging E.U. licensing platforms do not appear to
be limited to the repertoire of international music publishers.239
Despite all fears in this respect, 24 E.U. direct licensing is not
developing into the exclusive domain of Anglo-American music
publishers. As mentioned above, platforms for the repertoire of
small and medium sized publishers are emerging alongside those
of the big music publishers. In addition, other platforms comprise
the entire repertoire of existing collecting societies-big and
small. 241 That means that big and small repertoire will be available
online at equal terms. The two examples above show that E.U.
licensing, far from being a threat, can actually be a motor for
cultural diversity.
In light of this it is sometimes difficult to understand why
direct licensing or tendering of repertoire for such a purpose would
be perceived as a threat to cultural diversity. If a right-holder
wishes for certain forms of exploitation, to license his repertoire
directly by means of an intermediary of his choice, this should be a
commercial option available in a market economy. His choice will
be motivated by the attempt to safeguard the value of his music in
the online space. Experience shows that direct licensing can
nowadays be exercised by small and big publishers alike.242 Direct
licensing is also an option that can be exercised both by Anglo-
American publishers and Continental collecting societies-both
the MCPS/PRS and SACEM/SGAE have set up licensing
platforms. Cultural diversity does not appear in danger.
239 Id.
240 The European Parliament appears especially afraid that the Recommendation's prime
beneficiaries are major, international music publishers that control the repertoire that is
essential for successful online licensing. The Recommendation is seen as an instrument
favouring large repertoire and allowing music majors to better exploit the Internet. See
Report on the Commission Recommendation, supra note 86, at 11.
241 See Lider, supra note 209, at 19-20.
242 On January 21, 2007, the U.K. Music Publishers Association (MPA), representing
small and medium sized music publishers, announced that their repertoire would be
available for E.U. wide online licensing through "Alliance digital," run by the U.K.
society MCPS/PRS. See Press Release, The MCPS-PRS Alliance, supra note 225.
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On the other hand, the Recommendation does not force any
right-holders to engage in direct licensing.243 In a functioning
internal market, one should respect the freedom of those who
choose this option. It is one way to safeguard the value of music in
the online sphere.
Finally, it appears prudent to wait and see how the tendering of
repertoire for direct online licensing will develop in the future
before extending this principle to other forms of exploitation. As
the Recommendation is not a binding act, the national legislator is
free to act in this respect, if he wishes to do SO.
2 4 4
On the governance front, "[t]he international confederation of
music publishers is working with GESAC, the E.U. umbrella of
collectives, towards developing online E.U.-wide licensing
activities within the framework of the Recommendation. The
Recommendation has also triggered dialogue on improving
governance principles with respect to all collective management of
copyright."
245
Collecting societies have "also embraced some of the
governance elements of the Recommendation. 246 In some cases,
music publishers are being offered more seats on the board-in
line with Point 13 of the Recommendation and the "economic
weight" criteria-and accounting vis-d-vis publishers is being
switched from a yearly to a quarterly basis-a concession which
goes beyond the Recommendation. 2
47
Of course, the emergence of a major online platform will
require effective dispute resolution. Point 15 of the
243 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54 (EC), OJ 2005
L276/54 (Westlaw).
244 See EUR-Lex - Process and Players, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (follow
"Process and players" hyperlink under heading "About EU Law" on left of page) §
1.3.5.1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (stating that "[a] recommendation allows the
institutions to make their views known and to suggest a line of action without imposing
any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed...").
245 Lider, supra note 209, at 18; see also ICMP/CIEM GESAC, Common Declaration
on Governance in Collective Management Societies and on Management of Online
Rights in Musical Works, July 7, 2006, available at http://www.smff.se/pdf/
ICMPGESACDeclaration070706.pdf.
246 LUder, supra note 209, at 18.
247 See Call for Comments, supra note 87.
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Recommendation addresses this issue. 248 In the absence of an E.U.
arbitration panel, Member States are invited to provide for
adequate and effective means for resolving disputes, especially
those that arise with respect to online tariffs.249 As evidenced by
point 4 of its "Call for Comments," the Commission remains
inclined to further strengthen the Recommendation in this
respect.
250
CONCLUSION-THE YEARS AHEAD
The 2005 Recommendation on E.U.-wide online licensing and
the cross-border collective management of copyright across the
E.U. is one example of the paradigm shift away from harmonizing
rights, toward improving the way these (harmonized) rights are
exploited commercially in the digital sphere across Europe. This
approach should reduce the cost of music licensing without
reducing income for Europe's creators.
The new focus on fostering market entry for interactive and on
demand services will influence the way in which the Commission
approaches copyright policy in the future. In order to foster
innovation and market entry, policy makers must create a
framework in which entrepreneurship, new business models, and
risk-taking are rewarded. Policy regarding intellectual property
should facilitate the development and dissemination of new
interactive and on demand services.
It is therefore essential that the framework for obtaining works
that are protected by these intellectual property rights be organised
as efficiently as possible. Licenses, as a default option, should
comprise a territorial scope that is in line with emerging business
strategies. But it is equally important that efficient online licensing
gives creators an economic incentive to make their work available
online. In order to achieve efficiency and market entry the
Commission should, in the years ahead, focus on the management
of intellectual property rights and engage in regular evaluation of
248 See Commission Recommendation 2005/737 at 57.
249 See Call for Comments, supra note 87.
250 Id.
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the existing harmonized rights, especially the "making available"
right.
